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ABSTRACT 
 
WHY DID INDIA NOT SIGN THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 
TREATY? 
AN ANALYSIS FROM REALIST AND CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVIST 
PERSPECTIVES 
Akan, Didem 
MIR, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Serdar Güner 
August 2006 
 
 
 This thesis analyzes the reasons why did India not become a party to the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  Realism and critical constructivism are chosen as 
the two theories to examine the constant factors leading to the Indian decision.  First, 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is analyzed.  Second, premises of offensive 
and defensive and neoclassical realism and their explanations of the Indian decision 
are highlighted and compared.   Third, critical constructivist examination of the 
Indian decision is conducted mostly based on Jutta Weldes’ arguments.  Last, the 
explanations of three variants of realism and critical constructivism on India’s 
decision are compared. It is concluded that realist variants explain the continuity of 
Indian decision as not joining the NPT mostly because of material elements, 
however, critical constructivists also show social, cultural and historical 
constructions behind the scene as important factors and try to point out to the internal 
dynamics that play a role in the representational practices.   
 
Keywords: International Relations, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 
India, Nuclear Weapons, Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism, Neoclassical 
Realism, Critical Constructivism                                                     
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ÖZET 
 
HİNDİSTAN NEDEN NÜKLEER SİLAHLARIN YAYILMAMA 
ANLAŞMASI’NI İMZALAMADI? 
REALİZM VE ELEŞTİREL YAPISALCILIK AÇISINDAN BİR İNCELEME 
 
Akan, Didem 
Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Serdar Güner 
Ağustos 2006 
 
  Bu tez çalışması Hindistan’ın Nükleer Silahların Yayılmama Anlaşması’na 
katılmamasının nedenlerini incelemektedir.  Realizm ve eleştirel yapısalcılık, 
Hindistan’ın kararına neden olan sabit etmenleri incelemek için seçilen iki teoridir.  
Öncelikle, Nükleer Silahların Yayılmama Anlaşması (NSYA) incelenmiştir.  İkinci 
olarak, savunmacı, çatışmacı ve neoklasik realizmin önermeleri ve bunların 
Hindistan kararını açıklama şekillerine dikkat çekildi ve bu açıklamalar 
karşılaştırıldı.   Üçüncü olarak, çoğunlukla Jutta Weldes’in görüşlerine dayanarak, 
Hindistan’ın kararının eleştirel yapısalcı incelemesi yapılmıştır.  Son olarak, 
realizmin bu üç dalının ve eleştirel yapısalcılığın Hindistan kararını açıklama 
biçimleri karşılaştırılmıştır.   Realizmin dalları Hindistan’ın NSYA’ya katılmama 
kararındaki devamlılığı çoğunlukla maddi öğelerle açıklarken, eleştirel yapısalcılar 
perde arkasındaki sosyal, kültürel ve tarihi yapılanmaları göstermekte ve betimsel 
pratiklerde rol oynayan içsel dinamikleri işaret etmeye çalıştığı sonucuna 
ulaşılmıştır.   
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası İlişkiler, Nükleer Silahların Yayılmama Anlaşması 
(NSYA), Hindistan, Nükleer Silahlar, Savunmacı Realizm, Çatışmacı Realizm, 
Neoklasik Realizm, Eleştirel Yapısalcılık 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Those nations who have atom bombs are feared even by their friends” 
- Mahatma Gandhi1 
 The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), has been an 
issue of discussion in the international relations field in terms of its particular setup, 
regime, safeguards system and impact on disarmament, since it entered into force in 
1970.  The NPT has a goal of achieving universal adherence to its regime.  Except 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that withdrew from the NPT in 
January 2003, and India, Pakistan and Israel have chosen not to join the treaty; every 
country in the world signed and ratified the treaty.  Nowadays, the NPT is once again 
capturing world attention, as Iran successfully enriched uranium on an industrial 
scale and declared its action irreversible.  Negotiations between Iran and Europe, and 
the possibility (although so far rejected by the US government) of direct negotiation 
between Iran and the United States are being discussed with reference to the NPT. 
Another subject of discussion revolving around the NPT is the development 
in relations regarding nuclear issues between the United States and India.  The 
United States has started bringing India into the fold with a significant agreement to 
                     
1
 Jasjit Singh, “Why Nuclear Weapons?” in Nuclear India Jasjit Singh (ed) (Delhi: Knowledge World, 
1998), p. 9. 
 2 
cooperate with it in the area of civil nuclear energy.  In turn, India has to take 
measures2 to assure the Americans’ security concerns regarding nuclear issues.  
However, this agreement is expected to be face obstacles before being ratified, such 
as Congress’s disapproval, harsh criticism from the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and 
resistance from Indian society due to the country’s tradition of non-alignment and its 
historically difficult relations with the United States.  All in all, such a move will 
require a re-reading and re-evaluation of the NPT and will certainly lead to severe 
challenges from several countries party to the NPT. 
In this thesis, the factors related to India’s choice not to sign the NPT are the 
main focus.  The analysis tests two theories (realism and constructivism) in terms of 
their ability to explain India’s decision to remain outside the NPT.  India is chosen 
for study for two main reasons.  First, it is one of the countries that have never been a 
party to the NPT.  In other words, its decision did not change due to relations with 
other countries as in the case of the DPRK.  Indian policy regarding nuclear issues 
shows continuity, indicating that the decision is not coincidental but a conscious one 
based on specific motivations and cost-benefit analyses.  The Indian situation, which 
of course has its own dynamics, may be a special case, but it is also enlightening in 
terms of determining how to understand the reasoning of other non-signatories of the 
NPT.  Second, ahead of potential new debates concerning India and the NPT in the 
light of above-mentioned initiative of the United States, the Indian case study will 
clarify to understand the main route of Indian nuclear policy, why India has 
developed and maintained its nuclear policy in the way that it has and what kind of 
changes can be expected regarding the US initiative in the Indian policy. 
 The thesis indicates epistemological and ontological differences between the 
                     
2
 These measures are explained and discussed in the following chapters of the thesis. 
 3 
explanatory factors of realism and constructivism, and identifies the antecedent 
conditions.  These dimensions demonstrate the intrinsic importance of the Indian 
case by identifying those factors that remained constant for almost seven decades in 
India’s security considerations and national interests. 
Realism and constructivism were chosen as the two theories to examine the 
Indian decision, because they display two very different world views and present 
alternative explanations.  Apart from analyzing Indian nuclear policy in relation to 
the NPT from broad realist and constructivist perspectives, this study also employs 
critical constructivism and different variants of realism as well such as defensive, 
offensive and neoclassical realism.  These branches will enhance explanatory 
nuances in the same grand realist family.  As to the constructivist analysis of Indian 
decision, the arguments draw mostly on critical constructivism with its premises 
being the closest to critical theory among in the constructivist family. The analysis 
trivially indicates explanatory differences between grand realist family and critical 
constructivism, yet it also reveals their common elements. 
The research presented herein will try to answer the following questions:  
Why did India not sign the NPT?  What has remained constant so that India has 
chosen to continue this nuclear policy? What is the Indian national interest in 
pursuing this policy? How did the decision serve to promote India’s national interests 
and security objectives?  In specific, what is the relationship between India’s national 
interests and security objectives? How do offensive, defensive and neo- realism 
explain India’s decision?  Do these variants of realism differ from each other in 
terms of the reasons they give for this decision, and if so how?  How might critical 
constructivists explain the Indian decision?  What is the relationship among India’s 
identity construction, culture and national interest?  How can the findings of realism 
 4 
and critical constructivism be compared?  What are their weaknesses and strengths?  
What is the contribution of this study to international relations literature?   
The second chapter focuses on the NPT.  It is devoted to the historical 
developments leading to the establishment of the NPT, the specific rules and 
regulations of the NPT regime, the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
the provisions of the treaty, and, lastly, the past and current situations of threshold 
states. 
The third chapter lies out Indian national security objectives and national 
interests, and also will introduce realist concepts. First, we will discuss the general 
atmosphere in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, and then the conditions India felt 
itself humiliated and determined its national interests and security objectives will be 
clarified. This chapter helps to give an understanding the national interests of India in 
relation to its nuclear capabilities, since it discusses the main concerns and 
geopolitical problems of India.  Then, the rationales and premises of offensive and 
defensive realism and neoclassical realism are explained, and the relationship among 
the geopolitical and strategic conditions of India, historical events and the country’s 
national interests are analyzed separately from the perspectives of these three 
different variants of realism.   
The fourth chapter centers on a critical constructivist examination of the 
Indian decision.  First, it will look at the main principles of the social and critical 
constructivists as well as their critiques of realism.  Second, the chapter analyzes the 
articulations embedded into the Indian national interests and establishment of these 
articulations by means of representational practices by state officials, and also the 
process of interpellating these articulations by individuals that embed state sentric 
approach as the national interest.  The articulation and interpellation process are 
 5 
discussed under three main headings:  First, the opponent and self-identity 
articulation, second, the influences of India’s postcolonial history on representational 
and interpellation practices, third, the link between technology, the articulation of the 
Indian identity, and the national interest. 
The conclusion harmonizes theory with the practical implications of the 
analyses conducted.  A comparison and evaluation of the weak and strong points of 
realism and critical constructivism are made, and includes a brief review of their 
claims regarding India, differences and critiques.  Last but not least, the possible 
implications of the study for the analysis of other countries not party to the NPT will 
be considered. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY  
 
 
 The discussions on nuclear weapons began in the international arena with the 
devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by American atomic bombs, and it seems 
like the problems related to their proliferation will continue to remain hot issues in 
the near future as well.  The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has been a 
diplomatic, technical and political obstacle for countries that have wished to possess 
nuclear weapons and technology, was not an overnight development, with countries 
suddenly realizing that they should “do something” about the nuclear arms race.  
Rather, it was the result of continuous efforts for almost three decades to prevent the 
spread of these weapons throughout the world.  In order to grasp the importance of 
the NPT, it is crucial to understand the historical developments leading to the 
establishment of the treaty.  These will be reviewed in the following section.  Then, 
the second part will analyze the general provisions and trace the progress within the 
framework of the regime that the NPT created. 
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2.1  THE GENIE IS OUT OF THE BOTTLE– HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND  
 In world history, scientific/technological progress has always found its 
reflection in military technologies.  In January 1939, German chemists Otto Hahn 
and Fritz Strassman discovered a new type of nuclear reaction called “fission”; their 
Austrian colleague, the physicist Lise Meitner, confirmed experimentally that this 
reaction released a vast amount of energy; a few weeks later the Hungarian physicist 
Leo Szilard, working in New York, showed that in the uranium fission process 
“about two” neutrons were emitted whenever a neutron released by this process 
collided with the nucleus of a Uranium 235 atom; and finally, in May 1939, Jean and 
Irène Joliot-Curie, Hans Halban and Leo Kowarski repeated Szilard’s experiment 
proving a self-sustaining fission reaction and took out the patents for the production 
of nuclear energy as well as nuclear explosives.3 This was the beginning of possible 
applications of nuclear energy for both civilian and military purposes.  The discovery 
of atomic fission in the late 1930s, in combination with democratic institutions, 
public and private educational funding in America and the quickly evolving field of 
nuclear physics, prepared the necessary ground for the invention of the atomic bomb 
in the USA.4  The outcome of the Manhattan Project, directed by J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, was three atomic detonations.  The first one was a test detonation in 
New Mexico.  In fact, the Trinity test, as it was called, is often considered the official 
beginning of proliferation.  The second was a uranium bomb called “Little Boy” that 
was dropped on Hiroshima and the third one was a plutonium bomb called “Fat 
                     
3
 David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency-the First Forty Years (Austria:  
the IAEA Publications, 1997), p.15. 
4
 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997), pp. 86-87. 
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Man” that targeted Nagasaki. This unconventional weapon5 was presented as being a 
tool for a quick and decisive United State’s victory over Japan in 1945.   
 Within a year of exploding the first atomic bombs, the American 
administration realized that there could be no guarantees that the Russians would not 
themselves build a bomb.  The idea that the American atomic monopoly could be 
maintained was not realistic.  Consequently, the United States accelerated an effort to 
bring nuclear energy and weapons under international control through the Baruch 
Plan, which was based on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report6 and then modified by 
Bernard Baruch who was a mentor and served American presidents in different 
capacities since the First World War. The Baruch Plan proposed “the ownership and 
control of all sensitive nuclear material and facilities by an ‘International Atomic 
Development Authority’, which would also closely monitor all less sensitive nuclear 
research activities”.7   Under the plan, states would be free to exchange nuclear 
information for peaceful purposes and nuclear energy would be subjected to a control 
mechanism based on inspection as to whether it was solely peaceful or not.  If there 
were illicit activities, then the authority would have the power to impose penalties on 
any violators without the possibility of veto by Great Powers.8  It means that the 
provisions offered in these plans were even superior to the United Nations Security 
Council because even in the UNSC, the proposals that are vetoed by any great power 
cannot enter into force.  Additionally, after all these parameters were settled, the 
system was intended to eliminate all existing nuclear weapons.  The Soviet Union 
found the plan unacceptable.  Although it was not accepted, the plan raised two 
                     
5
 Unconventional weapons are also known as weapons of mass destruction, namely nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons.   
6
 This report was published in 1946 and was America's first attempt to settle a policy on the control of 
nuclear energy. 
7
 Harald Müller, David Fischer and Wolfgang Kötter,  Nuclear Nonproliferation and Global Order, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.15. 
8
 Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma-An Introduction to the American 
Experience (New York:  Random House, 1987), p.135. 
 9 
questions central to the evolution of nuclear diplomacy:  “Firstly, can a clear 
technical distinction be made between military and civil nuclear activities?  
Secondly, if it cannot, is it acceptable to rely heavily on political commitments rather 
than technical distinctions and intrusive verification, to underpin any international 
regime created to manage them?9” The problems that the NPT is facing today are 
related to these two questions. 
 In the meantime, the situation in the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear 
capabilities was evolving as well.  The Soviet authorities learned that atomic bombs 
might be possible from a story by William Laurence published in the New York 
Times on 5 May 1940,  and established a Uranium Commission, whose activities 
were interrupted by 1941 German invasion.10  Although the Americans were quite 
careful in maintaining the secrecy of the Manhattan Project, espionage was a very 
important non-count to the development of the Soviet bomb.11  The invasion of 
uranium-rich territories12 and the Hiroshima attack hastened the Soviet efforts to 
make a hydrogen bomb.  This was one reason that the Soviets rejected the Baruch 
Plan; it would impede any chance for countries other than the United States to 
produce atomic weapons, and hence strengthen the American monopoly on nuclear 
technology.  The other reason was that the Soviet authorities did not like the idea of 
being inspected by an international body that could spy on Soviet technology.  The 
following year, the Soviets put forward a counterproposal involving inspections only 
for predesignated atomic facilities and leaving enforcement to the UNSC (United 
Nations Security Council).13  With this proposal, the Soviets hoped and expected to 
                     
9John Simpson, “Nuclear non-proliferation in the post-Cold War era”, International Affairs, vol. 70, 
No: 1 (January 1994), p. 19. 
10Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 92. 
11
 Ibid., p.94. 
12
 Ibid., p.95. 
13
 Smoke, National Security and Nuclear Dilemma, p.135. 
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get the American arsenals under control and to have a strong say in the enforcement 
issues as a power having a veto the UNSC.  On 29 August 1949, a successful atomic 
explosion was conducted in the USSR, and the phase of American nuclear monopoly 
turned into a bipolar nuclear scene.14  Proliferation to additional states was 
inevitable.   
 The Soviet test urged the United States to carry out certain adjustments in this 
new era.  The American response was threefold.  The United States expanded the 
production of atomic bomb; decided to produce a more powerful weapon based on 
fusion15 rather than fission and de-emphasized the utility of nuclear weapons.16  All 
these developments, needless to say, hampered any possibility of discussion of the 
international control of nuclear weapons proliferation.  Both countries entered into an 
ambitious arms race and their stocks expanded steadily within a short while.  This 
process is called “vertical proliferation”.17 In other words, vertical proliferation refers 
to proliferation of developing new types of nuclear weapons, technology and 
materials within states having nuclear weapons. Gaddis explains the paradox of the 
period in question: “as nuclear weapons became more numerous and more powerful, 
they also became less usable; but as nuclear weapons became less usable, one needed 
more of them to deter others who possess[ed] them”.18  The great powers were 
caught by this paradox and it took a considerable time for them to understand the 
value of curbing the proliferation of these weapons.  In the context of horizontal 
proliferation, in chronological order, the United Kingdom acquired nuclear power in 
1952, France in 1960 and China in 1964.  Israel is believed to have produced nuclear 
                     
14
 Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 98-99. 
15
 Weapons based on fusion promised explosive power in the range of millions of tons of TNT. 
16
 Ibid., pp.100-101. 
17
 Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Kitle İmha Silahları Konusunda Asıl Tehlike Devlet Dışı Aktörlerdir”, 2023 
(January, 2003), p.7. 
18
 Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 101. 
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weapons with the help of France in the late 1960s. 
The United States successfully detonated a hydrogen device in November 
1952, and with this the United States and the world entered the thermonuclear age.19  
In this age, threats were greater and the danger of a possible nuclear war was closer.  
On 8 December 1953, the United States President, Dwight Eisenhower delivered an 
important speech “Atoms for Peace” at the United Nations, which revealed the 
dangers of the nuclear era yet at the same time proposed a first step to put a brake on 
the arms race and lessen the threat of weapons of mass destruction.20  The speech 
emphasized the importance of exporting nuclear materials for peaceful purposes 
under safeguards.  In the 1950s, at least three types of peaceful use of nuclear energy 
were foreseen:  Electricity production, propulsion and civil engineering and 
mining.21  A policy evolved in subsequent years, by which the United States sought 
to use its superiority in civilian nuclear technology to counter the spread of Soviet 
influence in the Third World.22   
Later, the speech was accepted as the keystone of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (the IAEA), whose founding statute came into force in 1957.  The 
IAEA played an important role both in promoting peaceful nuclear development and 
keeping the spread of nuclear weapons under control.23 Eisenhower’s Atoms for 
Peace proposal seemed easy to implement, and promised to create mutual trust in 
cases where the Americans and Soviets discovered that they could cooperate on a 
specific project.24  Nonetheless, the general atmosphere after the speech was not very 
                     
19
 Jack M. Holl and Roger M. Anders, “Atoms for Peace-Introduction” in Milestone Documents in the 
National Archives  (N.a.), p.1.  Available online at: http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/atom1.htm. 
20
 Benjamin P. Grene, “Eisenhower, Science and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate 1953-56”, The Journal 
of Strategic Studies, vol. 26, no: 4 (December 2003), p.160. 
21
 Simpson, “Nuclear Non-proliferation in the Post-Cold War era”, p. 20. 
22
 Müller, Ficsher and Kötter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order, p. 16. 
23
 Smoke, National Security and Nuclear Dilemma, p.136. 
24
 Jack M. Holl and Roger M. Anders, “Atoms for Peace-Introduction”, p.3. Available online at: 
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/atom3.htm 
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optimistic, because the Soviet Union rejected this proposal, even though it was not 
really a disarmament proposal25, and in 1954 detonated a thermonuclear bomb that 
was stronger than the one detonated over Hiroshima.26    
By the mid-1950s, the superpowers were producing disarmament schemes 
due to a real desire to decrease the number of arms, because rapidly evolving 
strategic technology was offering less security as hydrogen bombs and long-range 
bombers proliferated on both sides.27  Vertical proliferation was getting more lethal 
and so motivating the parties to adopt efficient arms control proposals.   
 In 1955, primarily in order to collect intelligence and secondarily in order to 
ease tensions between the two superpowers, Washington offered an “Open Skies” 
proposal.  President Eisenhower reasoned that getting permission to over fly Soviet 
military facilities while granting permission for the Soviets to fly over American 
military installations would greatly contribute to confidence building.28 The next 
year, the United States authorities also proposed a mutual cutoff in producing 
fissionable material.29  It became quite clear that these attempts were for the sake of 
arms control, not of propaganda; however, the views of great powers were so 
divergent that no agreement could be reached.  Even so, the atmosphere seemed 
promising in comparison with the past.  The Antarctica Treaty of 1959 banned any 
sort of military base or activity there and held territorial claims in abeyance for thirty 
years.30  In 1959 Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and in 1961 US President John 
F. Kennedy proposed plans for “general and complete disarmament”.31  Perhaps 
neither leader supposed that their proposals would be negotiated seriously but at 
                     
25
 Smoke, National Security and Nuclear Dilemma, p 136. 
26
 Kibaroğlu, “Kitle İmha Silahları Konusunda Asıl Tehlike Devlet Dışı Aktörlerdir”, p.6. 
27
 Smoke, National Security and Nuclear Dilemma, p. 137. 
28
 Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Public Website, Open Skies Proposal, (N.a.).  Available online at: 
http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/history/coldwar/cw12.htm 
29
 Smoke, National Security and Nuclear Dilemma, p. 137. 
30
 Ibid., p.149. 
31
 Ibid., p.139. 
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least, this showed their good will and awareness of the need for action in the 
disarmament area. 
 The Atoms for Peace policy had significant consequences.  The United States 
entered into numerous nuclear cooperation agreements with other nations and the 
IAEA began to safeguard nuclear operations on a modest scale.32  After realizing that 
earlier Soviet help had enhanced China’s capabilities to acquire nuclear weapons, the 
Soviet Union changed its views regarding the desirability of a stronger non-
proliferation regime.  The new regime was to be based on the first IAEA 
comprehensive safeguards system, entitled INFCIRC/66, (1965) which was extended 
several times in order to cover all types of nuclear plants.33   Moscow realized that a 
Chinese bomb was not less threatening than a German bomb.34  It can thus be 
concluded that the Chinese acquisition of a nuclear weapon motivated the Soviet 
Union to “accept a regime which would allow the use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes, while at the same time creating a system of assurances against its diversion 
to military ends”.35  The United States also considered a wide range of responses to 
China’s atomic test.36  It was completely against the American national interests to 
loosen the control in terms of nuclear weapons over Asia, increasing the level of 
horizontal proliferation and geopolitical stability of Europe.37  In other words, the 
Chinese bomb eased the path towards a common understanding and approval of the 
NPT regime by both superpowers. 
Another major cause for the Soviet change of policy was the 1962 Cuban 
Missile Crisis, which reminded both superpowers that nuclear war was a real threat 
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and that they had to improve their relations to counter this threat.  This fearsome 
crisis led to establishment of the “hot line” telecommunications link between 
Moscow and Washington, which used Teletype because written communication was 
felt to leave less room for misunderstandings.38  The second result of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis was a multilateral Limited Test Ban Treaty, dated 1963, which ended 
testing by the United States, the USSR and the UK in the atmosphere, in outer space 
and in the sea.39    It brought the spread of radioactive materials in the atmosphere 
largely to a halt. As a consequence of this treaty, the world saw that arms control and 
disarmament agreements were possible even while the competition between blocs 
was continuing.40 
The Outer Space Treaty, signed in 1966 and entered into force in 1967, 
declared that “states shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass 
destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other 
manner”.41    
 The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco)42 predated the NPT and represented the first 
effort by a group of states to establish a nuclear weapons free zone in a region as a 
nuclear non-proliferation policy.43  After these many steps, then the NPT came in 
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1968. 
 
 
2.2 THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY – THE FUNDAMENTALS  
The NPT was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.  According to 
this treaty, whose details will be examined in the following sections, countries that 
had possessed and/or tested nuclear weapons up until that time, would be labeled as 
nuclear weapons states and they would prevent nuclear weapons material leakages to 
countries that did not have nuclear weapons.  In addition, nuclear weapon states 
would also show that they were making the necessary effort in order to achieve 
complete disarmament.  One notable characteristic of this treaty is that states not 
having nuclear weapons would not produce nuclear weapons but would be allowed 
to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful ends.  The NPT signatory non-
nuclear weapon states were expected to comply with the decisions of the IAEA.  In 
summary, the NPT is based on three pillars -nuclear non-proliferation, peaceful 
nuclear cooperation and nuclear disarmament- with each pillar contributing to the 
integrity of the whole.44  The treaty stood as a strong diplomatic and political barrier 
for future would-be nuclear threshold states and the IAEA was entitled to be a 
technical institution that was forming the verification system within the NPT.  It 
should be noted that, in the beginning, a long list of non-nuclear countries did not 
sign the treaty, including France (although it stated that it would abide by it), China, 
Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.  In time, 
the non-proliferation trend improved and all countries except Israel, Pakistan and 
                                                          
Nonproliferation), (Washington, DC: 20 January 2001).  Available online at 
http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/2001/4595.htm. 
44
 “2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons”, Chapter 2 (New York:  2-27 May 2005), p.1. Available online at:  
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/presskit.pdf.  
 16 
India signed it.   
The NPT has special characteristics that determine its framework.  
Operationally, Article VIII.3 specifies that once in every five years, the NPT 
signatories convene for Review Conferences in order to “review the operations of 
this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the 
provisions of the Treaty are being realized”.45  This practice would enable the NPT to 
respond to modern-day threat perceptions and keep its system workable in the face of 
new developments.  Another important characteristic of the NPT is its power of 
indirect sanction through the IAEA.  Upon a referral from the IAEA Board of 
Governors based on a noncompliance report and sufficient evidence that a country is 
acting contrary to its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement, under Chapter VII 
of the U.N. Charter the Security Council can impose mandatory economic, 
diplomatic or even military sanctions on that country.  Third, nuclear weapon states 
are supposed to give two kinds of guarantees to non-nuclear weapon states in the 
context of NPT diplomacy.  The first one is a negative security assurance, meaning 
that a nuclear weapon state would neither launch nor threaten to use a nuclear 
weapon against a non-nuclear weapon state.  The second one is a positive security 
assurance.  The concept of positive security assurance came to the fore on the 
initiative of Washington, the Soviet Union and the UK in 1968.  They announced 
that they “would seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter to any NPT non-nuclear weapon state 
threatened with the aggression involving nuclear weapons, or which is the victim of 
such aggression”.46  This led to the adoption of Resolution 225.  Accordingly, 
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victims of the aforementioned aggression would be assisted and protected by the 
United Nations system.  Both of these two security assurances have not been legally 
binding and have two objectives:  Convincing non-nuclear weapon states to sign the 
treaty and protecting the established regime. 
Since a better understanding of the verification system and provisions of the 
NPT will help to illustrate the importance of the treaty, first, brief technical 
information on nuclear weapons and the enrichment process will be given and the 
role of the IAEA as the technical-verification tool will be analyzed.  Second, the 
main provisions and their further implications for non-proliferation will be examined.  
Lastly, the problems generated by threshold states will be explored and evaluate 
current situation of threshold states. 
 
2.2.1  NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE IAEA 
The explosive energy of nuclear weapons is derived from either fission (the 
splitting of the nucleus of an atom into two or more parts so highly enriched uranium 
and plutonium release energy and neutrons while being bombarded by neutrons), 
fusion (light isotopes of hydrogen, such as deuterium and tritium, join at high 
temperatures and release energy and neutrons) or a combination of the two nuclear 
processes.47  Most of the commercial nuclear power reactors operating or under 
construction in the world today require plutonium (Pu239) and uranium “enriched” in 
the U235 isotope for their fuel.48   A large quantity of the uranium occurring in nature 
is in the form of the U238 isotope, which is heavier than U235.  Since the fuel for a 
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commercial reactor or the material for a nuclear weapon has to be made up of 90 
percent or more U235, natural uranium must be enriched at an enrichment plant to 
achieve this concentration.49  There are two techniques for enrichment:  the gaseous 
diffusion method and the gas-centrifuge method50.  The latter involves smaller 
equipment and is easier to hide than the former in the case of illegal activities.  
Breeder reactors are based on plutonium recycling.  Compounded with the dual-use51 
of some nuclear materials, principally both breeders and gas-centrifuges are 
especially subject to IAEA inspections because the materials in a reactor designed 
for peaceful purposes can be used in weapons production processes as well.  But 
what is the IAEA and under what authority does it inspect nuclear materials of the 
NPT signatories? 
The International Atomic Energy Agency was founded in 1957 to promote 
nuclear cooperation and the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies.  
The IAEA is a specialized agency integrated within the United Nations system.  It 
has three main roles:  furthering peaceful uses of nuclear energy in science, 
especially for the critical needs of developing countries; promoting nuclear safety 
and security for nuclear and radioactive materials in civilian use; and, verifying in 
more than 900 civilian facilities that nuclear materials are not used in making nuclear 
weapons.  The IAEA is not a party to the treaty but under the NPT, the agency has 
specific roles as the international safeguards inspectorate and as a channel for 
transferring peaceful applications of nuclear technology.52 The IAEA has been 
conducting inspections of nuclear facilities more than four decades and the agency 
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expanded its activities noticeably after the NPT came into force in 1970.53  Article III 
of the NPT states that non-nuclear weapon states have to conclude a safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA and declare all of their nuclear material and facilities in 
which it is processed or used; this material subjected to IAEA inspections or 
safeguards.54   This statement illustrates the fact that the NPT is not based solely on 
political commitments but also on technical commitments.  The parties to the treaty 
have to sign INFCIRC/153, which is the basis for agreements with non-nuclear 
weapon states regarding safeguards.55 The Agency also acts as a channel for the 
further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in 
consideration of the needs of the developing areas of the world under Article IV and 
has roles in connection with verification of nuclear-weapon-free zones and ex-
nuclear weapon material.56 
 Until the expansion of the IAEA authority through the Model Additional 
Protocol57 (May 1997), inspectors suffered from strict limitations under the NPT 
safeguards system.  In the first phases of the treaty, the inspection system was 
considered as something unduly troublesome, increasing the operational costs of 
nuclear industry, and inspectors were suspected of being industrial spies.58   This 
approach reversed the course of the safeguards system and led to the safeguards 
under the NPT being applied only to the “flow” of nuclear materials, with routine 
inspections being conducted at mutually agreed “strategic points” in nuclear plants 
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by surveillance instruments (such as cameras and sensors) and containment (use of 
seals and instruments to identify any effort to open a sealed store).59  Additionally, an 
NPT non-nuclear weapon state can announce that a plant has been closed down and 
that all nuclear material formerly in it has been removed.60  In this case the IAEA has 
no authority to inspect this plant.  Despite these shortcomings of the safeguards, 
countries have tried to strengthen nuclear export controls by establishing new 
institutions and groups.  For instance, the Zangger Committee had its origins in 1971, 
when major nuclear suppliers regularly involved in nuclear trade came together. In 
1974 they “published a Trigger List, that is, a list of items that would "trigger" a 
requirement for safeguards and guidelines ("common understandings") governing the 
export of those items to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) that are not party to the 
NPT”.61  The most important feature of the guidelines is that in order to supply 
nuclear materials or equipment, it requires an IAEA safeguard and obliges the 
receiver to apply the same conditions when transferring the materials to another non-
nuclear weapon state.  Another effort to ensure that nuclear transfers would not be 
diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear explosive activities was the creation of the Nuclear 
Suppliers’ Group (NSG).  It was created following the Indian explosion in 1974, 
which demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could 
be misused.  The NSG Guidelines were published in 1978 as IAEA Document 
INFCIRC/254 to apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes.62 
There are other limitations of the system and endeavors to overcome them; 
however, they are not directly linked to the main issue of this study.  Despite the 
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imperfections of safeguards system, a country’s signing the NPT and accepting its 
verification system is still one of the best ways to give assurance that all its nuclear 
activities are peaceful, and thus creating confidence among nations.63   
 
2.2.2  PROVISIONS 
The NPT text is composed of ten articles.  It is the document that politicians, 
international relations scholars, whose area of interest is nuclear weapons, and 
nuclear arms control experts most often refer to.  In this respect, it would be useful to 
analyze the articles of the NPT.  This examination is intended to explain both the 
main motives and concerns of parties to the treaty and to show actual and potential 
breaches of these provisions.   
Article I constrains the transfer of nuclear weapons or material from a nuclear 
weapons state64 (henceforth NWS) to any non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS).   
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any 
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control 
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to 
assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices.65 
The first article of the treaty thus concerns the limitations upon nuclear weapon 
states.  My interpretation of this article is as follows:  Since a very limited number of 
countries are allowed to have nuclear weapons, the NPT must contain something that 
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makes NNWSs believe that this treaty promotes their security even though they do not 
have nuclear weapons and NWSs do not have unlimited rights regarding to nuclear 
energy.  Although they are free to have nuclear weapons, they cannot transfer these 
materials or weapons to other NNWSs.  In this way, a NNWS does not need to worry 
that one of its neighbor countries that is supported by a NWS, can develop a nuclear 
weapon programme with the latter’s assistance.  Within this scope, the steadfast 
priority given to NNWS status reflected itself in the first article immediately.  All 
NNWS, which are party to the treaty, are aware of the fact that none of them are 
allowed to transfer a nuclear device or weapon so under this situation, proliferation is 
avoided.  This is why states accepted NNWS status.  The treaty guarantees non-
proliferation among them and proves that the treaty serves for their nuclear security. 
On the other hand, the article does not prohibit the transfer of nuclear material among 
the NWSs.   For instance, the USA can cooperate with the UK in its nuclear weapon 
programmes. 
It should be kept in mind that not all of the five NWSs were party to the NPT 
at that time.  In 1968, China and France did not sign the treaty.66   In 1988, China 
concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and on 9 March 1992 it acceded 
to the NPT as the fourth nuclear weapon state.67  As early as 1968, France 
announced that it would act as if it were a party to the treaty but it was the last 
acknowledged nuclear weapon state, joining the NPT on 2 August 1992.68   
 The efforts by states party to the treaty, however, could not eliminate 
possibility of breaches.  The United States and Britain were accused of helping 
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South African to prospect, develop and process its uranium reserves.69  The most 
important doubts about the breach of the article concern American aid given to the 
Israeli nuclear programme after the NPT entered into force.   On the other hand, 
Israel and South Africa had already acquired critical technology from France and 
firms in the Federal Republic of Germany long before the NPT existed.70  India, as 
one of threshold states, was provided a nuclear plant by Canada in 1956 and 
received heavy water from the United States.71  Pakistan and India received help 
from China and used plants and material illegally exported from the USSR.72  All 
these examples, although they were not reported officially, show the difficulties in 
achieving meaningful results in nonproliferation efforts. 
 Article II focuses on the role of NNWSs within the scope of the NPT.   
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the 
transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or 
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.73 
 NNWSs are forbidden to acquire nuclear weapons/devices by this article.  
The provision does not touch upon the issue of actual “possession” because in the 
late 1960s, no country other than the “nuclear five” was recognized as a nuclear 
weapon state.74  If a threshold state or newly independent state that have nuclear 
weapons having nuclear weapons, decided to sign the NPT, it would have to 
dismantle them immediately and place all nuclear materials under the IAEA 
                     
69
 Fischer, Towards 1995,  p.35. 
70
 Ibid., p.38. 
71
 Ibid., p. 38. 
72
 Ibid., p.39. 
73
 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, p.2. 
74
 Fischer, Towards 1995, p. 43. 
 24 
safeguards system.75  The cases of South Africa, when it decided to become a party 
to the NPT in 1991 and Ukraine (1994) are the examples of the successful operation 
of this mechanism. 
 North Korea is believed to make a breach of this article.  North Korea (the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – DPRK) officially became party to the 
NPT in 1985. In 1992, North and South Korea agreed to denuclearize the Korean 
peninsula and North Korea signed the IAEA safeguards agreement.  By this 
decision, it accepted all the IAEA safeguards in order to ensure that the DPRK does 
not acquire nuclear weapons and uses its nuclear technology for peaceful ends.  
However, in 1993 the DPRK refused to accept a special IAEA inspection team and 
announced that it was withdrawing from the NPT.76  The United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 825, the talks among the DPRK, the United States and the IAEA 
resulted in a suspension of the North Korean withdrawal and an “agreed framework” 
that allowed the construction of two new proliferation-resistant light-water 
moderated nuclear plants in exchange for the shutdown of all other plants in the 
DPRK in 1994.77  Nonetheless, North Korea withdrew from the NPT in January 
2003, so the safeguards agreement is no longer in force.  All these events triggered 
the doubts of North Korea received transfer of some kinds of nuclear weapons 
and/or devices and made a serious breach of Article II during its membership of the 
NPT. 
 The Iraqi breach in 1991 was the first case that the IAEA found of a state in 
violation of its safeguards agreement.  In July 1991, the IAEA discovered that Iraq 
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had clandestinely tried to produce highly enriched uranium by the use of calutrons 
(a form of mass spectrometer separating U 235 from U238) and had succeeded in 
producing a small amount of lithium, which is generally used for the production of 
hydrogen/thermonuclear weapons.  These findings were obvious breaches of Article 
II, indicating that Iraq had secretly attempted to manufacture nuclear weapons.  The 
Board of Governors of the IAEA handed in its report to the UNSC, and Resolution 
687 was passed, requiring the destruction of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons capabilities under the auspices of the IAEA.  Later on, this event furthered 
studies on enhancing the ability of the IAEA to detect clandestine activities and led 
to the establishment of a model Additional Protocol and the 93+2 programme.78 
Article III generally sets the rules between the IAEA and signatory states 
regarding safeguards.   
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as 
set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the 
fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed 
with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, 
processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The 
safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its 
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.  
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special 
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon 
State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be 
subject to the safeguards required by this article.  
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to 
comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or 
technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of 
peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and 
equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes 
in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth 
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in the Preamble of the Treaty.  
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either 
individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence 
within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing 
their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such 
agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall 
enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.79 
 If Article III.1 and III.2 are analyzed, it is possible to conclude that 
safeguards aim to eliminate undetected nuclear material transfer.  The safeguards 
that the IAEA applies to NNWSs that did not sign the treaty, upon the demand of 
these countries, regarding any bilateral or multilateral arrangement related to nuclear 
energy, are based on the document entitled INFCIRC/66 Rev.2. It is “item specific” 
and covers individual facilities, specified nuclear material and/or specified items of 
equipment or non-nuclear material.80 The safeguards that are applied to NNWSs 
party to the treaty are set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/153, which offers 
broader and clearer guidelines than INFCIRC/66 in regard to application of 
safeguards.81  In one-year period, IAEA safeguards inspectors carry out over 2000 
inspections at over 600 facilities.82  The IAEA can certainly get involved if it finds 
an unreported nuclear material or plant83, as in the Iran case, but it is not allowed to 
apply safeguards to an entire facility.  Additionally, it cannot inspect nuclear 
materials that are used for military purposes in a NWS. 
 Since the first three articles are the main provisions determining the logic 
and mechanism of the treaty for tackling with horizontal proliferation, the remaining 
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articles will be discussed only briefly here.  Article IV states that the NPT does not 
impair countries’ right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  All party states 
“have the right to participate in transfer of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”.84  The article 
also emphasizes the need of these kinds of exchanges between the regions of 
developing NNWSs within the context of the tangible social and economic benefits 
that these exchanges can offer for these countries’ sustainable development.   
 Article V guarantees access to the benefits of the peaceful application of 
nuclear explosions under international observation on a non-discriminatory basis.  
Today, this technology is not valid but at the time the article was written, nuclear 
explosions were presumed to be necessary for nuclear research and development.  
 Article VI calls upon every NWS and NNWS to commit itself to work 
towards eliminating arms race and complete nuclear disarmament at an early date.  
Treaties such as the ABM (Treaty on Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems), 
SALT I and II (Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms), the INF (Elimination of 
Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles), CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty) and SORT (Strategic Offence Reductions) Treaties, as well as initiatives 
such as START I and II (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), the Soviet Threat 
Reduction Act (Nunn-Lugar legislation) and the Trilateral Initiative Working Group 
consisting of the Russian federation, the United States and the IAEA, and 
announced amounts of permanent removal of fissile materials can be considered as 
achievements of the NPT Article VI.   
Article VII is a short provision noting that countries are free to conclude 
                     
84
 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (Article IV.2), p.2. 
 28 
agreements in order to establish Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ), that is, a 
concrete mechanism ensuring total absence of nuclear weapons in a specified 
territory.  In this regard, the Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
(1967), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga - 1985), 
the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (the Bangkok Treaty - 
1995), the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty - 1996) 
and Mongolia’s Nuclear Weapons Free State Status are not alternative but 
complementary to the NPT. 
 The regular review conferences of the NPT specified in Article VIII are still 
being held.  Every five years, NPT signatories convene with the objective of 
reviewing the operation of the NPT, facilitating dialogue between the signatories 
and if necessary, making amendments responding to new challenges facing non-
proliferation by a majority vote, which must include five NWSs.  Among these 
reviews, the Review and Extension Conference (1995) was a groundbreaking 
meeting.  This conference extended the treaty indefinitely.  By this way, parties to 
the treaty were guaranteeing their commitments to facilitate nuclear disarmament 
and non-proliferation.85  It also strengthened the review process of the treaty, and in 
addition, a resolution on the Middle East was adopted.86 The last Review 
Conference was held from 2-27 May 2005 in New York. 
 Article IX covers the details related to the ratification process and Article X 
puts forward the special conditions for withdrawal from the treaty (on three months 
notice) and schedules a conference in the twenty-fifth year of the NPT’s coming into 
                     
85
 British American Security Information Council, The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference 
(N.a.). Available online at:  http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/NPT/1995revcon/main.htm.  
86
 Federation of American Scientists, NPT Chronology.  Available online at: 
http://fas.org/nuke/control/npt/chron.htm 
 29 
force regarding its extension, namely the Review and Extension Conference that 
was held in 1995.   
 The NPT is a milestone international agreement, whose goal is preventing 
the spread of nuclear weapons and their technology, facilitating peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy and eventually achieving nuclear disarmament.  The means the treaty 
provides to achieve these goals are forbidding the transfer of nuclear weapon 
materials from NWS to NNWS, the acquirement of nuclear weapon materials 
transfer by a NNWS and putting all transfer among states under safeguards.  Despite 
some defects, the NPT, which has been signed by 188 states, has been the basis of 
global the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
 
 2.2.3 THRESHOLD STATES87 IN THE PAST AND TODAY  
 In 1954, India was the first country to suggest the conclusion of an 
agreement banning the testing of nuclear weapons, either as an independent measure 
or as one item in an agreement on more comprehensive forms of disarmament.88  On 
the other hand, it also was one of the first countries, along with Pakistan and Israel 
that chose not to join the treaty.  India refused to join the treaty on the basis that it 
was a discriminatory because of its grouping of countries as NWS and NNWS.  
And, in 1974, it was the first country that openly went ‘threshold’.  India’s ‘peaceful 
nuclear explosion’ at Pokhran in Rajasthan in that year was a sore shock for the non-
proliferation regime.  It was the first explosion officially proclaimed by a nation 
classified by the NPT as a NNWS.   If the Pokhran test had taken place before 1 
                     
87
 Threshold states are the countries, whether a party to the NPT or not, with at least the capability of 
developing nuclear weapons. 
88
 Müller, Ficsher and Kötter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order, p.17. 
 30 
January 1967, India would have been one of the five (in that case six) nuclear-
weapons states under Article IX.3 of the NPT.89  India used plutonium produced in a 
reactor that Canada had supplied in the late 1950s for nuclear research for peaceful 
use, without safeguards, in the aftermath of the Atoms for Peace programme.90   
Similarly, India has continued with efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, and on 11 
and 13 May 1998 it conducted a series of nuclear tests, proclaiming itself a NWS.  
In its current position, India uses nuclear reactors both for weapons manufacturing 
and energy production. (India gets 3.3% of its electricity from 14 operating reactors 
and 9 more are under construction.)91 
 Pakistan followed India in seeking nuclear weapons.  By the late 1970s, 
Pakistan was able to build an unsafeguarded plant for producing enriched uranium.92  
After India’s so-called peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, both the USA and France 
feared a likely Pakistani nuclear test as a response to India and stopped the flow of 
military and economic aid to Pakistan.93  In these years, Pakistan was believed to 
begin receiving support from China in relation with its nuclear rivalry with India.  
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States renewed its aid 
programme to Pakistan in order to strengthen its hand in front of the Soviet Union.  
However, this aid was given on the condition of assurance that Pakistan did not 
process a nuclear weapon, and in November 1990, the American administration was 
unable to provide such a certification.94  In 1992, Pakistan publicly admitted that it 
had the ability and elements which, if put together, could create a nuclear device.95  
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In the end, Pakistan tested its nuclear devices on 28 and 30 May 1998, just after 
Indian tests.   On 6 June 1998, the Security Council, in Resolution 1172, condemned 
the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan as a threat to global nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament.96  The Final Document of the 2000 Review 
Conference also reaffirmed that any new party to the treaty would be accepted only 
as a NNWS.97  In other words, the accession of a state, having nuclear capabilities, 
to the NPT is not acceptable unless it puts all its nuclear material under the IAEA 
safeguards and foregoes its nuclear weapons. 
Israel is believed to have acquired its first nuclear weapon before the NPT 
came into force, most probably in the late 1960s.  Israel used plutonium produced in 
Dimona reactor, which was the result of the secret nuclear cooperation between 
Israel and France that was formalized in a set of agreements between the two 
governments in October 1957.98  Regarding the nuclear weapons issue; however, 
Israel neither confirms nor rejects the existence of a nuclear programme but only 
states that “Israel will not to be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons to the 
Middle East”.99  It is estimated that Israel has about forty hundred nuclear warheads 
in various tonnages, which are sometimes referred to “bomb in the basement”.100  
By the censorship101, the word “bomb” in reference to Israeli weapons was banned 
and the only phrase commentators were allowed to use was “the nuclear option”.102 
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 Aside from these three main threshold states, there have been other states 
that were on the way to acquire nuclear weapons but which then sign the NPT, as 
well as states that were parties to the NPT but later on had problems regarding 
adherence to the treaty obligations.  South Africa was a threshold state that 
announced in 1976 that it had built a pilot plant to enrich uranium without the IAEA 
safeguards103 and was suspected of testing a nuclear device in cooperation with 
Israel pinned on the basis of images taken by a US satellite over the South Atlantic 
in 1979.  In 1988, South African foreign minister publicly acknowledged that his 
nation had the ability to produce a nuclear weapon.104  In 1991, South Africa joined 
the NPT and in 1993, its president announced that the country had developed six 
fission devices and they were in the process of producing the seventh one.105  All of 
them were dismantled and put under the safeguards of the IAEA in order for South 
Africa to be declared a NNWS.   
 In 1970s and 1980s, Argentina and Brazil were competing with each other to 
be the first to manufacture a so-called “peaceful” nuclear explosive device, which 
was permissible under the Tlatelolco Treaty.106  These acts along with the tension 
between the two nations were decreased to an extent with the establishment of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials in 
1991.  Argentina acceded to the NPT in 1995 and Brazil in 1998.  
 As related above, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea withdrew from 
the NPT in 2003.  It is important to note that the DPRK is a rare case in terms of its 
constructing a reprocessing facility at Yongbyon without foreign assistance from the 
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advanced nuclear-suppliers countries.107 The IAEA Board of Governors states that 
the Agency’s NPT safeguards agreement with the country remains binding and in 
force.108  Nevertheless, the DPRK’s status poses a severe challenge to the non-
proliferation regime since the IAEA has not had access to the DPRK to conduct 
verification activities since December 2002, so that the Agency cannot provide any 
level of assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material.109   
 Libya signed the NPT in 1968, ratified it in 1975, and concluded a 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1980. Unfortunately, its commitments did 
not keep Libya, under Muammer Qadhdhafi, seeking with varying degrees of 
success, nuclear technologies, fissile materials, and weapons designs and know-how 
from several countries including China, Pakistan, the Soviet Union/Russia, Belgium, 
and Ukraine.110  However, in December 2003, Libya announced that it had decided 
to eliminate materials, equipment and programmes that might be used to produce 
internationally banned weapons and accepted international inspection teams to 
verify its compliance with its commitments.111  In 2004, Libya signed the Additional 
Protocol. 
 Like the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran over the years engaged in undeclared nuclear activities. In 2003, the IAEA 
Board of Governors disclosed that Iran had failed to report certain nuclear material 
and activities.112   In the same year, Iran signed the Additional Protocol to its IAEA 
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safeguards agreement.  On 15 November 2004, Iran, France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom came to an agreement and Iran decided to continue and extend its 
suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities113.  Nevertheless, 
the IAEA was not in a position to ensure that there were no undeclared nuclear 
materials or activities in Iran.114  By the beginning of 2006, Iran initiated a plan to 
restart nuclear research of civilian nuclear power.  Great powers still work on a 
resolution text on the issue. Currently, Iran’s compliance with its commitments is a 
very delicate and serious topic for nuclear non-proliferation and the future of the 
Middle East. 
 India, which is one of threshold states, will be the case study of this study.  
In the following chapter, India’s decision not to become a party to the NPT and its 
ongoing foreign policy in terms of nuclear power will be analyzed through realist 
lenses.  Different types of realism such as defensive, offensive and neoclassical 
realism will help in understanding the Indian decision from different rationalities 
within realist framework. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE INDIAN DECISION THROUGH THE LENS OF REALISM 
 
 
The control of the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries has been 
the goal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for almost four decades.  All but three 
countries in the world, India, Pakistan, and Israel have currently ratified it.  Except 
for North Korea, which joined the NPT in 1985 and recently withdrew, these 
countries have not changed their decision of not being a party to the treaty up until 
now.  India and Pakistan’s criticisms concentrated on the discriminatory nature of the 
NPT, as it divides the world into haves and have-nots115 and becomes a legal basis 
for the recognition of the monopoly of five nuclear weapon powers to possess and 
use nuclear weapons.116 These critiques have usually been presented as one of the 
basic tenets of the Indian, and also the Pakistani, decision not to sign the treaty. 
 
3.1  INDIAN SECURITY OBJECTIVES 
If a clear definition of Indian national security objectives is obtained, it will 
be much easier to establish the relationship of Indian security objective concept with 
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Indian national interests that will be defined in the following section.  On the official 
website of the Indian Ministry of Defence, we can see an overall picture of the 
security objectives formulated around the core concerns of India: 
1. Defending the country’s borders as defined by law and enshrined in the Constitution; 
  
2. Protecting the lives and property of its citizens against war, terrorism,  nuclear  
threats and militant activities;  
3. Protecting the country from instability and religious and other forms of radicalism 
and extremism emanating from neighboring states;  
4. Securing the country against the use or the threat of use of weapons of mass 
destruction; 
5. Development of material, equipment and technologies that have a bearing on India’s 
security, particularly its defence preparedness through indigenous research, 
development and production, inter-alia to overcome restrictions on the  transfer of 
such items; 
6. Promoting further co-operation and understanding with neighboring countries and 
implementing mutually agreed confidence-building measures; and 
7. Pursuing security and strategic dialogues with major powers and key partners. 117 
The second, fourth and fifth points are related to the nuclear policy of India.  
It can be seen from the second and fourth points that India aims to protect the 
country and its citizens against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.  
These nuclear threats, of course, are not explicitly stated in the text.  Excluding 
terrorist nuclear attacks, at the regional level there are two countries that can be 
inferred as being the possible nuclear threats to India: China and Pakistan.  
Additionally, the fifth point indicates that India intends to overcome all restrictions 
on the transfer of material, equipment and technologies that are seen as essential to 
India’s defence.  It should be borne in mind that India always points out that its 
nuclear weapons program is purely for defensive purposes.118  Accordingly, India 
opposes the restrictions that are imposed by the IAEA on the NPT signatories 
because these limitations do not allow the country to have a nuclear program even 
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for defensive reasons.  Under India’s security objectives, it is not possible to accept 
regulations limiting the development of its nuclear capacity. 
The national security objectives outlined above present the background to 
the current situation.  In the 1960s, Pakistan was not a nuclear power.  Rather, the 
main nuclear threat was China.  October 16, 1964 was one of the most significant 
moments affecting Indian nuclear policy because on that day China became a 
nuclear power and Indian policy-makers began to think seriously about acquiring 
nuclear weapons.119  India also perceived its soil as being vulnerable to the missiles 
deployed by the US and USSR in those years.120  Having a nuclear state as a 
neighbor and in addition feeling threatened by the ballistic missiles of the Great 
Powers, India chose to develop a nuclear capability for protecting its territory.  The 
NPT restrictions, which put strict limitations on transfers of materials and obliged its 
signatories to announce themselves as non-nuclear weapon states, were totally 
contrary to its security concerns.  India decided not to accept the status of a NNWS, 
since China was legally recognized as a nuclear weapon state. 
 
3.2  BASIC REALIST PRINCIPLES AND INDIAN NATIONAL 
INTEREST IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR POWER 
In order to understand the fundamental Indian national interest, it is 
necessary to take a quick look at how realism paints the picture of world politics.   
Even though the variants within realism come up with different assumptions, there 
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are three cornerstones that show continuity:  state centrism, survival and self-help 
(the ‘three Ss’). 121   
The ordering principle of the international system is anarchy.  There is no 
higher authority other than the states themselves to check and balance their actions.  
Consequently, nation-states are the main players in this system.  In other words, 
sovereignty inheres in states, because there is not a higher ruling body in the 
international system.122  This is known as state centrism.  Survival is continuing to 
be sovereign.  Sovereignty is the distinctive feature of states and its meaning is 
strongly tied to use of force.123  According to the most of the realist variants, states 
are “black boxes”; the determinative factor is states’ observable behavior, not their 
leaders’ characteristics, their decision making processes or their government 
systems.124   
Realism, in its purest form, is based on the following assumptions:  In the 
absence of a higher authority, states cannot be sure of the intentions of other states.  
This uncertainty leaves states in a self-help system.  Due to the uncertainties of 
anarchy, states have to guarantee their own survival, and this is the main driving 
motive of states.125  They cannot rely on any authority, state or institution other than 
their own capabilities.  Because states must take care of themselves, the most 
effective means to protect themselves are the military capabilities.126   Realism 
claims that states are rational actors that are able to make cost and benefit 
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calculations and try to maximize their national interests.  National interest results in 
the development of a set of maxims to preserve and maintain the survival and 
security of sovereign state in the anarchic system.  Sometimes, states are threatened 
by other powers, which can call the sufficiency of a country’s capabilities into 
question.  In cases where the survival of a state or a number of weaker states is 
threatened by a coalition of states and/or a hegemon, they must establish an alliance 
in order to sustain their survival and balance the opponents’ power.127  This is the 
balance of power mechanism. 
India is simply another rational unitary state pursuing its national interests in 
order to ensure its survival.  A long history of conflicts with its neighbors, namely 
Pakistan and China, made India sensitive to any change in its neighbors’ strategic 
steps.  India began its nuclear research in 1944 and until the 1962 Sino-Indian war 
(which was a humiliation for India) and the 1964 Chinese nuclear explosion, the 
primary objective of the Indian nuclear programme was the development of a power 
supply to meet long-term civilian needs.128  After China became a nuclear power in 
1964, India first became concerned about having a neighbor, with whom India had 
problematic border relations, with nuclear weapons.  It would been almost 
impossible to deter an attack from China with conventional weapons.  In regard to 
this development in 1964, “Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri launched a 
program to reduce the time needed to build nuclear arms to six months”129.  India’s 
perception of a prior threat originated with the Chinese nuclear test, and India 
started to change the direction of its nuclear research at that time. 
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India meant to reach its security objectives through various channels.  
Between 1964 and 1965, India not only modified its nuclear research policy in the 
light of Chinese nuclear status, but also bide for a nuclear guarantee from NWSs.  
India conducted this policy to secure its existence against nuclear China even at the 
probable cost of compromising the country’s nonaligned stance.130  However, in 
May 1965, it was proved that no nuclear guarantee would come out of visits to the 
United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.131  Two years after the 
1965 Indo-Pakistani War, in 1967, the United States offered a guarantee but since it 
did not have the force of law, it failed to meet the Indian requirements.132 
China had officially announced its support for Islamabad’s advocacy of a 
plebiscite in Kashmir, which India was strongly against, during the 1962 conflict.133  
Hence, the close relationship between China and Pakistan was already a source of 
tension.  Indian national interests necessitated obtaining a binding security guarantee 
against both the new Chinese nuclear threat and a potential Sino-Pak nuclear 
collaboration, as was proven in mid-seventies after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War.  
Geographically, India was between Pakistan and China.  A Sino-Pak alliance, 
especially a nuclear one, could have ended up disastrously for India, which was 
sandwiched between the two states.  Ironically, the NPT, which was signed in 1968, 
presented India as a NNWS whereas China, which had initiated an armed conflict 
against India in 1962, was given NWS status.   
Unless a regional disarmament was reached it was unacceptable for India to 
sign the NPT.  India was in favor of overall nuclear disarmament and a nuclear 
                     
130
 Šumit Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II-The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi’s 
Nuclear Weapons Program”, International Security, Vol.23, No:4 (Spring 1999), p. 153. 
131
 Ibid., p. 155. 
132
 Ibid., p. 157. 
133
 Hilary Synnott, The Causes and Consequences of South Asia’s Nuclear Tests, Adelphi Paper, No: 
332 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 15. 
 41 
weapon free zone in South Asia.  India still has not changed its stand on this issue.  
Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated that his “government's policy is 
consistent with the nuclear disarmament policy that successive governments have 
followed.”134  Although the NPT had provisions regarding the encouragement of 
nuclear disarmament, there has been little development of disarmament of great 
powers.  This has always been a justification for India.  In the absence of an 
agreement on a timetable for nuclear disarmament, India has had to assure its 
security by nuclear means.135  In accordance with Indian national interests, it might 
be said that India’s policy of keeping its options open to develop nuclear weapons 
was born with New Delhi’s decision not to accede to the NPT.136   
In the final analysis, it can be concluded that India’s utmost national interest 
was guaranteeing its survival and sovereignty.   Consequently, the nuclear policy of 
India was set up in order to guarantee its border unity against China’s nuclear 
weapons.  China’s nuclear capability and its close relations with Pakistan were 
perceived as threats to national security and existence from the Indian side.  
However, while India’s national interest includes its national security objectives, it 
cannot be reduced only to security objectives.  In fact, it might be said that security 
objectives are antecedent variable as motivating operational tools influencing and 
strengthening the power of the national interest to determine the foreign policy of 
the state. 
In the subsequent sections, three different variants of realism will be used in 
order to analyze India’s decision not to sign the NPT.  Using these variants will help 
to identify constant indicators for this continuing policy from different realist 
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perspectives.  This method will also facilitate the examination of whether there 
might have been other foreign policy options open to India. 
 
3.3  OFFENSIVE REALISM 
 Another variant of realism is offensive realism.  The best-known offensive 
realist is Professor John Mearsheimer.  While he agrees with defensive realism on 
many assumptions, he differs from common defensive realist premises, where the 
behavior of states is concerned.137  Mearsheimer states that the anarchical 
international system forces states to maximize their relative powers because the 
uncertainty of other states’ intentions reinforces the self-help principle based on 
relative gains.138  Mearsheimer claims that “offensive military action is always a 
threat to all states in the system”.139 Focused on relative capabilities, states, as they 
become more powerful, will try to maximize their influence and control over the 
international environment.140  The accumulation of power often works at the expense 
of other states.  It is the only way to guarantee state survival, and aggression is the 
cornerstone of state relations.   
 In the realm of state security, relative power is described in terms of military 
capabilities.  There are two important aspects of military power: the distribution of 
power between states and the nature of the military power available to them.141  
Distribution has to do with the number of poles and their relative power.142  States 
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pursue expansionist policies when and where the benefits prevail over the costs.143  If 
the nature of military power favors offence, it is expected that states having 
expansionist motivations (aggressor) will go to war.   
 In summary, in situations other than bipolarity and nuclear deterrence, 
security is scarce and states formulate their foreign policies around their relative 
capabilities and their external environments.144  Offensive realism usually makes its 
predictions about foreign policy decision on the basis of systemic factors.  Units are 
undifferentiated and exist in an anarchy defined in Hobbesian terms.   
 Clearly, it can be concluded that according to offensive realism, it would have 
been a disaster if India had decided to sign the NPT as a NNWS.  Since India could 
never be sure about its neighbors, with whom it had had severe border disagreements 
and armed conflicts, it had to follow the current developments in their military 
capabilities and act accordingly, calculating its own military power in comparison 
with theirs.  China’s nuclear test in 1964 both unbalanced the distribution of military 
capabilities of the region and completely changed the nature of those capabilities.  
First, China became one of the five NWS and thus was promoted to the status of a 
great power.  Second, China turned out to be a strong candidate for regional 
hegemony due to its nuclear capability.  In addition to this, the unconventional 
character of this new capability could easily change the balance to India’s 
disadvantage.  From the offensive realists’ perspective, the only secure periods in 
world politics are periods of bipolarity and nuclear deterrence.145   
In the absence of nuclear deterrence, India was under threat of Chinese 
military aggression all the time.  The same was valid for Indo-Pakistani relations 
after Pakistan acquired nuclear capability.  Indeed, deterrence is a demanding 
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strategy, but Mearsheimer defines nuclear weapons as a superb deterrent; they ensure 
high costs and are practical in terms of self-defense if not aggression.146  Nuclear 
weapons have some pacifying effects; they provide security, generate caution, 
impose forceful equality and create a clear relative power.147  So, India’s decision to 
go nuclear after rejecting the option of signing the NPT was very rational in 
offensive realist terms.  India could not rely on an international treaty that recognized 
China as a NWS while placing India in a NNWS status.  Even if the structure of the 
treaty had not been otherwise, in an international system whose main principle was 
self-help, India should not have become a party to a treaty like this.  States can 
guarantee their survival only by relying on their relative power, and international 
institutions and norms will not benefit them in the long run.   
In conclusion, India’s decision regarding the NPT and nuclear capabilities 
was rational.  It was an appropriate foreign policy decision according to the offensive 
realist position, because India was disturbed by the changing relative power relations 
in the region and had to develop a military capability that ensured its security and 
basic national interest, survival. 
 
3.4  DEFENSIVE REALISM 
Defensive realism agrees with the basic principle of the realism paradigm 
that world politics is anarchic, but assumes a more peaceful atmosphere than the 
Hobbesian state of war.  States are not at war with each other all the time because 
security is not scarce and states can understand or learn how to achieve it by 
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experience.148  Units (states) are highly differentiated.  Rational states are security-
seekers, which try to maintain the status quo, and they respond to external threats, 
which rarely appear, primarily by balancing the power distributed among states.149  
This means that anarchy’s repercussions are not constant.  States are “defensive 
positionalists” because they try to preserve the balance of power.150 
The security dilemma151 and its variability are very important concepts in 
defensive realism.152  The security dilemma always exists, but states resort to 
aggression only if structural modifiers change the offense-defense balance in favor 
of offense.   Stephen Van Evera defines the offence-defence balance as an aggregate 
of military technology and doctrine, geography, national social structure and 
diplomatic factors such as defensive alliances and balancing behavior.153  Military 
technology can favor the offender or the aggressor.154  Natural or human-made 
obstacles and wide buffer regions such as third states or demilitarized zones insulate 
states from invasion.155  Yet, the closer are two foes to each other, the more intense 
the security dilemma.156  Additionally, access to raw resources also influences the 
severity of the security dilemma within the geographic parameter. Regimes that are 
popular with their societies are usually better at both conquest and self-defense.157 
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The perceptions of state leaders and elite are influential.158 Lastly, collective 
security systems, defensive alliances and the balancing behavior of neutral states 
strengthen the defense of a state.159   Whereas Van Evera presents four different 
structural modifiers are presented as the influencers of the level of the security 
dilemma, Jeffrey M. Taliaferro states that the third modifier –the national social 
structure’s affect on foreign policy and domestic politics- is explained in accordance 
with defensive neoclassical assumptions.160  Since it represents a variant of 
neoclassical realism, they will not be used directly for analyzing Indian case under 
the heading of defensive realism, but rather under that of neoclassical realism. 
The intractable nature of the security dilemma forces defensive realists look 
for implications of this phenomenon in the Indian case as well.  The security 
dilemma posits that military buildups can change the adversary’s beliefs in such a 
way that the former believes that the other state is more dangerous than previously 
thought.161  India, which experienced a devastating war with China in 1962, 
believed that the 1964 Chinese nuclear explosion not only changed China’s status 
from a regional power to a global nuclear power but also posed a serious threat to 
India’s existence by means of this new weapons system.  In the face of new 
developments in the Chinese nuclear buildup, “Indian analysts concluded that 
without nuclear weapons, India would face bullying and further aggression akin to 
the 1962 débâcle.”162   Moreover, the security dilemma had implications for the 
entire subcontinent. The 1971 war between India and Pakistan that resulted in the 
creation of Bangladesh persuaded Pakistan, which was conventionally weak in 
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comparison with India, that it needed a nuclear capability. Joeck summarizes the 
situation as follows: “India’s competition with China also fuels Indo-Pakistani 
competition.”163 The military build ups appended to a history of conflicts drew these 
three states, which did not foresee each other’s intentions clearly, into a severe 
three-sided security dilemma. 
A security dilemma is presented as being the source of extreme competition 
and war, yet its level of intensity depends upon structural modifiers.  These are the 
relative distribution of capabilities that determine an individual state’s particular 
diplomatic and military strategies.164  Improvements in the firepower and strength of 
neighboring countries are incentives to build strong central institutions, maintain 
large standing armies and adopt offensive strategies.165   Geographically, India was 
able to defend itself against both Pakistan and China.  India was more powerful than 
Pakistan in view of size and potential.  It would also be in a better position to defend 
itself if a war like that of 1962 occurred with China because the forces that could be 
deployed and sustained on Himalayan borders were limited.166  These geographic 
factors have not changed from 1968 to 2006.  Consequently, geographic structural 
modifier did not change; it is eliminated as an explanatory variable of the continuity 
of the Indian decision.  The second structural modifier within the scope of the 
security dilemma is military technologies/capabilities.  In a conventional military 
scenario, India is able to sustain its national security.  Singh underlines the 
significance of the nature of military systems in threat perception by stating “it is the 
nuclear factor that places us at a disadvantage by neutralizing the [our] intrinsic 
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superiority on the two [Chinese and Pakistani] key frontiers.”167  One of the prime 
predictions of the offense-defense theory is that “a state will initiate and fight more 
wars in periods when it has, or thinks that it has, larger offensive opportunities and 
defensive capabilities.”168  India perceived the situation as being that if India did not 
establish nuclear capabilities; it would furnish China with offensive opportunities 
because it would not be possible to deter nuclear weapons with Indian conventional 
forces.  It would disturb the offence-defense balance in favor of offense for China, 
and leave India open to Chinese attacks. 
Unless nuclear disarmament, which is fundamental to Indian strategic and 
security interests, is implemented, India believes its only option is to initiate and 
further its nuclear capabilities in the face of a potential nuclear threat.  Becoming a 
party to the NPT would leave India vulnerable to China’s nuclear weapons and the 
indirect danger of export of nuclear technology by China to the countries in the 
region.  Since the mid-1960s, when China as a NWS threatened to enter the 1965 
Indo-Pakistan war on Islamabad’s side, a possible Sino-Pakistani front has been a 
chronic worry.169   
In the light of the Indian national security objectives and interests cited, it 
can be concluded from the view of defensive realism that India could not choose to 
sign the NPT and could not be expected to become a party to the treaty as a NNWS.   
Joining the treaty would be risky for India’s survival.  India, considering its location 
in a region with a strong NWS, China, and the possibility of China’s entering into an 
alliance with Pakistan involving the transfer of nuclear technology and devices (see 
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the Indian national interest and security objectives).  Defensive realism explains the 
situation in terms of the security dilemma (Indo-Chinese competition that also 
triggers Indo-Pakistani competition), especially on the basis of the military 
capabilities, the structural modifier.  Not only has the situation vis-à-vis China not 
changed, but the same kind of Indian response that was generated by the newly 
emerging unconventional nature of the Chinese military system in the 1940s has 
now been elicited by the presence of an additional nuclear actor, Pakistan.  Situated 
as it now is between two neighbors having nuclear weapons, India should not be 
expected to sign the NPT as a NNWS in the near future. 
 
3.5  NEOCLASSICAL REALISM 
Neoclassical realism primarily examines the relationship between the foreign 
policy of a nation and its domestic politics.  Neoclassical realists do not counter 
Waltz’s ideas on international structure and its consequences, but also add first and 
second image170 variables in order to analyze foreign policy.171  They are realists 
because they believe that the international system and relative power capabilities 
largely shape the foreign policy of a state; but they are neoclassical realists because 
they state that unit-level intervening variables affect the impact of structure and 
relative material capabilities on foreign policy.172  Gideon Rose claims that political 
leaders’ and elites’ perceptions of relative power do matter in the foreign policy 
decision-making process, and this is why some states’ behaviors do not match the 
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predictions of the balance-of-power theory: leaders or elites can misperceive the real 
distribution of capabilities.173  Zakaria reformulates traditional realist assumptions 
about expansion.  He states that when important decision-makers perceive a relative 
increase in state power, nations try to expand their interests abroad.174  Thus, 
statesmen are the main actors.  Additionally, national power is not the same as state 
power, which is a “fraction of national power that the state apparatus can extract for 
its purposes.”175  It means that the unit of analysis is not the nation but the state.  
Expansionism is a tendency arising both from the international and the domestic 
power of a state.176   
In summary, neoclassical realists argue that there is not any direct link 
between relative material capabilities and foreign policy decisions.  The perception 
of relative power on the part of political leaders’ and the elite is the intervening 
variable.  Thus, analysis of power has to include the strength and structure of a state 
in its examination.  Lastly, systemic pressures might influence the general direction 
of foreign policy but not the details of state behavior.177 
Is neoclassical realism capable of explaining the Indian decision not to 
become a party to the NPT?  Does taking the perception of leaders’ and the elite into 
consideration change the overall picture of this foreign policy decision?  The 
answers to these questions require an analysis of Indian elite perception and the 
general Indian political framework.  Accordingly, first, the Indian elite’s perception 
of nuclear weapons will be analyzed.  It will then be integrated into the overall 
picture of the period of the late sixties and early seventies. 
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The Indian armed forces have always supported the idea of preserving 
national security by means of the nuclear option.  Even though the Indian Army was 
excluded from nuclear decision making until 1995-96, it had demanded nuclear 
weapons since the mid-1960s.178  In addition, the Indian nationalist elite saw the 
Indian nuclear weapon and missile capability as being very important.  Nuclear 
weapons possessed a significant power because India itself developed these high 
technological weapons and they would help to regain the relative power advantage 
in the face of Chinese nuclear tests.  
India began its civilian nuclear programme under Nehru in 1948.179  India 
had a hesitant attitude towards nuclear weapons because of its ahimsa180 tradition.  
Nehru believed that “military spending was, at best, a necessary evil.”181  However, 
the defeat of India by China and Beijing’s nuclear tests made it necessary to 
reevaluate this attitude. Just before the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war ended, one hundred 
members of the Lok Sabha182 called for India to exercise the option to develop 
nuclear weapons in letters to Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri.183  This was a 
prime indicator of how the Indian political elite favored the nuclear option and put 
pressure on the government for this end for achieving a better relative position 
against Pakistan. After Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s failed attempts to get a 
nuclear guarantee, which indeed proved once again that the Indian government 
viewed the situation as being dangerous in relative capability terms and the 
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emergence of a different group of political leaders in India, the decision to prepare a 
nuclear test was made in 1972.184 
Nuclear capabilities were seen in some quarters in India, notably in the 
Ministry of External Affairs, as indicators of state power.185  Leaders and the elite 
perceived a country like China, which supported Pakistan and with which India had 
severe border disagreements, as with nuclear weapons, an immanent threat.  Unless 
global disarmament was achieved, signing the NPT as a NNWS would decrease 
India’s relative power in the region, especially against it traditional enemies China 
and Pakistan.  Since military and political elites believed that its possession would 
put India at a similar level with China and prevent nuclear blackmail by Washington 
or Beijing.186  Otherwise, India would be in a disadvantageous position due to its 
decreased relative capabilities. The Indian government did not have to use 
domestically popular policies in order to persuade the public to support its decision, 
because there was in fact no resistance from society against the nuclear option.  In 
terms of Zakaria’s state power concept, India was domestically powerful in this 
regard.  Thus, in the early 1970s, “India had both the capability and the political 
motivation to conduct a nuclear test.”187 
To sum up, defensive realism posits two structural modifiers to explain 
security dilemma that India experienced.  One of them is geographic proximity.  
India and its neighbors’ borders have not changed significantly since India’s 
independence; the geographic modifier is sufficient to prove the severity of the 
security dilemma faced by India.  Accordingly, it could not explain why India chose 
not to sign the NPT.  The military technology that China had was the main element 
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that could be put forward as a basic change in Sino-Indian military relations 
according to the tenets of defensive realism.  In order to guarantee its survival, India 
did not sign the NPT and went nuclear.  It should be noted that if the situation 
regarding the possession of unconventional weapon systems by the three countries 
(India, China and a nuclear latecomer of the region, Pakistan) does not change 
overall, it will not be possible for India to become a party to the NPT.  In other 
words, in the absence of a global and/or regional nuclear disarmament, India will 
not change its decision. 
Offensive realists can find Indian decision rational as well.  China’s nuclear 
test altered both the distribution of military capabilities and their nature.  India’s 
relative military capability significantly decreased in comparison with China’s and 
this situation endangered Indian national security objectives.  According to the 
tenets of offensive realism, India was right to choose going nuclear in order to 
ensure its survival without relying on any outside institution or treaty. 
Neoclassical realism puts forward another perspective regarding the Indian 
decision.  Although it states that relative power does matter as an independent 
variable, and foreign policy is the dependent variable, neoclassical realism claims 
that the perception of state leaders and the elite is the intervening variable. State 
leaders and the elite perceived China’s nuclear status as an disconcerting element to 
the disadvantage of India in terms of relative capabilities.  This was why India did 
not sign the NPT.  However, there is a point here to clarify.  The assumptions of 
defensive and offensive realisms are valid as long as the theoretical conditions that 
they specifically asserted are met for India.  In the paragraphs above, it was 
indicated that these conditions have not changed.  On the other hand, neoclassical 
realism seems to explain a foreign policy decision only for a given time in a certain 
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situation.  Since the main aim of this study is to find the basic motivations 
underlying the continuity of Indian nuclear policy, neoclassical realism might be 
inadequate in terms of providing a general explanation.  Of course, it is possible to 
conclude that successive governments and political and military elites have 
maintained the same perception regarding Indian relative capabilities.  However, it 
is not possible to say that these successive governments and elites have maintained 
the same perception unless analyzing them as well.  So the continuity of the foreign 
policy is not as clear-cut as it is in defensive and offensive realism.  Overall, it 
seems that these two variants of realism –defensive and offensive- provide the most 
compelling analysis of India’s decision to remain outside of the NPT and develop a 
nuclear capacity.   
Within the scope of this analysis, a quick overview of three realist variants 
on independent variables that remained constant will be useful.  Offensive realism 
suggests that any state might initiate an aggression any time because of their 
expansive nature.  Rapid military buildup is essential because states must employ all 
their resources to maximize their power.  Since the unclear intentions of states 
towards each other shadow the possibility of trust, it is not possible to rely on 
international organizations and treaties.  Consequently, India’s relative power 
concerns in the face of China’s nuclear tests led to the refusal of being a party to the 
NPT.  Today, India still cannot be sure about China’s intentions and as long as 
China and Pakistan keep their nuclear weapons, India can never sign the treaty.  On 
the other hand, defensive realism concludes that except the conditions that 
aggressive rhetoric worsens the international atmosphere, states are security seekers 
that only respond to threats.  States intend to modernize their weapons in order to 
reach a moderate par with the closest competitor/opponent.  The security dilemma is 
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shaped around security modifiers such as the nature of weapons and geographic 
proximity.   The severe security dilemma between China (later also Pakistan) and 
India, which coupled with the unconventional nature of nuclear weapons and India’s 
security objectives, does not allow India to sign the NPT.  Neoclassical realism puts 
forward that state leaders and political elite have perceived keeping nuclear option 
open as an efficient way to secure India’s relative power in the international 
atmosphere especially against China and Pakistan.  Unless a drastic change in these 
political elites’ minds on the Indian relative power occurs, it is rational for India not 
to become a party to the NPT. 
In the next chapter, India’s decision will be analyzed through constructivist 
lenses and see ontological, epistemological and methodological difference between 
constructivism and realism.  The next chapter will also provide a critique of realist 
theory too.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
CRITICAL CONTRUCTIVIST VIEW ON THE INDIAN 
DECISION 
 
 
 When the Indian decision was analyzed and explained through the various 
realist lenses, the arguments are built mostly around concepts such as national 
security, national interest and relative security.  Although the three realist variations 
differ from each other to an extent, they share a more or less common understanding 
of these terms.  Moreover, realist theory (except in the case of neoclassical realists, in 
view of their inclusion of domestic politics) defines the above-mentioned terms 
based on conceptualizations made by state officials.  Besides, the ruling principles of 
the world of international politics (anarchy and the self-help system) are objective 
facts and they are given.  Since these realities exist ‘out there’ to be discovered, 
realism does not leave much room for change in basic principles and concepts. 
 On the other hand, constructivism proposes quite a different way of analyzing 
world politics and its bases.  According to social constructivism, all the actors and 
relations among them are socially constructed.  These actors do, however, have 
certain identities, and their national interests are shaped around these identities.  In 
the following sections, the main constructivist premises and their implications for the 
analysis of Indian national interests will be discussed in more detail.   
 This chapter will question the Indian decision not to sign the NPT from a 
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critical constructivist perspective.  The first section will set forth the general claims 
of social constructivism and critical constructivism, and will discuss how 
constructivists counter realist arguments.  In other words, it will serve as a space for 
criticizing realism.  With this as background, the second part of the chapter will 
focus on the Indian decision as based on Indian national interest, and try to determine 
how this national interest has been produced through articulation and interpellation. 
Indeed, the main source of this analysis will be Jutta Weldes’ studies on national 
interest. Weldes’ constructivism provides two very important tools: first, it gives a 
social constructivist view of international relations, and second, her critical 
perspective leads this study toward a more comprehensive path by including to a 
certain extent a discourse analysis examining the articulation and, to an extent, 
interpellation mechanisms.  This will allow the reader to see how India’s post-
colonial and non-aligned identity and its position as the regional leader both shaped 
its national interests and their expressions and was shaped by them.  In order to 
reveal the continuity and/or discontinuity of certain identities, examples from recent 
history will be given as well.   
 
4.1  SOCIAL AND CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 Social constructivism is regarded primarily as a theory that tries to bridge the 
gap between rationalist theories (neo-realism, neo-liberalism and Marxism) and 
alternative approaches (post-modernism, feminism, normative theory, historical 
sociology and post-colonialism).   Divergent branches of constructivism (trivial, 
radical, social, critical and cultural constructivism) occupy different polls of this 
bridge.  
 A survey of the concepts and claims of social constructivism, which 
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distinguish it from rationalist theories, will serve to clarify the differences between 
the realist paradigm and constructivism.  The central argument is the way it regards 
reality as being constructed188.  In contrast to the realist claim, reality is not out 
there waiting to be discovered; rather, it is socially and historically produced, and, 
moreover, “culturally bound knowledge enables individuals to construct and give 
meanings to reality”.189  Consequently, the international environment in which states 
exist consists of not only material factors but also cultural and institutional factors.  
This has a number of implications.  For example, the identities of actors and the 
terminology they use are socially constructed.  Interests, and concepts such as 
anarchy, balance of power, and relative security are not givens; they are the results of 
a specific social interaction process.  Actors give meanings to their actions and the 
objects they construct.  So, while rationalists define culture as a constraint on action, 
social constructivism disagrees with this, stating that culture provides the meanings 
that people give to their actions.190  Since all meanings are the consequences of 
certain interactions, they are subject to change.  From this formulation, it can be 
derived that international norms, rules and regulations have an effect on states’ 
policy making.  Moreover, social constructivism also opens up the ‘black box’. It 
does not accept the state as the only actor in world politics.  It emphasizes the role of 
non-state actors and domestic politics on foreign policy decision making.  Lastly, for 
social constructivists, “power is not only the ability of one actor to get another actor 
to do what they would not do otherwise but also the production of identities and 
interests that limit the ability to control their fate”.191  Thus, identifying identities and 
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interests is a source of power. 
 There are various power nodules that influence identity.  Constructivism 
deemphasizes the state and highlights these nodules, so it draws a different picture of 
world politics and power than realism does.  This picture dilutes the power of power 
and its concentration, displaces it and opens up possibility for change.  It is also a 
more complex framework than the international relations understanding of realism. 
 Critical constructivism also critiques realism’s understanding of actors, 
insecurities and threats of realism as fixed entities.  This understanding leads to, in 
certain respects, self-evident conclusions.  For example, realism argues that in an 
anarchical world, the security dilemma is inevitable and perpetual.  This perception 
does not allow for any change in the situation, and expects states to accept this 
situation and act accordingly.  This is a problem because policies based on fix 
insecurities, threat perceptions and identities make the cooperation between states 
harder and does not allow for new openings in foreign policy.  Thus, insecurities are 
unavoidable realities, which are constructed based on the security of pregiven 
entities, usually the state.192  Critical constructivism tries to call the taken-for-granted 
status of political actors and their insecurities into question and seeks to denaturalize 
them to show how they are culturally produced.193  In part, this production of 
insecurities is linked to states’ identities; in part, the cultural production of these 
identities shapes the perceived insecurities.194   
 Identities influence the threat perception and are affected by it, but also 
emerge in relation to difference.  What makes an identity unique is its difference 
from other identities; however, the difference of other identities sometimes threatens 
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the established identity as well.195  At this stage, difference is usually presented as 
otherness, and in turn as a source of insecurity. 
 The social construction conclusion of critical constructivism does not deny 
the material facts, but rather analyze how the meanings of these material entities are 
produced, reproduced and transformed culturally and historically.  Critical 
constructivists focus on identities, presentations and the productive powers of 
discourses; therefore, critical constructivists work deconstructively. Common 
reference points of critical constructivists serve to clarify their claims further: 
1. What is understood as reality is socially constructed. 
2. Construction of reality reflects, enact, and reify the relations of power.  In turn, certain agents 
or group of agents play a privileged role in the production and reproduction of these realities. 
3. A critical constructivist approach denaturalizes dominant constructions, offer guidelines for 
the transformation of common sense, and facilitates the imagining of alternative life-worlds.  
It also problematizes the conditions of its own claims; that is, a critical constructivism is also 
self reflexive.196 
 
Hence, critical constructivism looks at world politics within a social and 
cultural environment, but at the same time it adds a critical dimension in order to 
reform these environments for contributing the achievement of constructivism 
applied as a referent.197  It is an invitation to rethink conceptual foundations of 
policy-making instead of a recognition positivist tenet that are accepted as given.  
Not just that “critical” implies an awareness of power dynamics that underlie the 
identity process, and the fact that knowledge is power and each type of knowledge is 
produced by somebody for a reason.  So the knowledge realism produces serves to 
keep the status quo and justifies a certain type of power.  Dislodging knowledge from 
this power is only possible if the main pillars of that knowledge, such as national 
                     
195
 Ibid., p. 11. 
196
 Ibid., p. 13. 
197
 Martin Dougiamas, “Critical Constructivism” in A Journey into Constructivism, (November 
1998).  Available online at: http://dougiamas.com/writing/constructivism.html#critical 
 61 
interest, are dislodged and re-constructed.  It leads to an underlying effect:  if it is not 
believed that the national interest is the only given truth, than it is no longer believed 
that the people in power “must” know it as it is and be right.    This is one of the most 
distinctive features of critical constructivism.   
Since state-centric approaches are generally the most widely dominant 
discourses,198 critical constructivists question the production and reproduction of 
these discourses and power-knowledge relation in their construction.  Discourses are 
both linguistic and nonlinguistic practices, and they also have material effects.199  
Thus, critical constructivism does not merely analyze “just words” but is intensely 
interested in the material effects of discourses as well200.  An analytical examination 
of discourse and its material effects will be presented in detail in the following 
section to provide a critical constructivist explanation of the Indian decision 
regarding the NPT. 
 
4.2  THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL 
INTEREST REGARDING NUCLEAR POLICY 
In the last chapter, viewing the situation from the realist perspective, the 
analysis of India’s decision regarding its nuclear policy was predicated on India’s 
national interest.  Most articles on Indian nuclear policy discuss this decision based 
on the same terms.  It is important to note that realism is unable to answer the 
following questions:  If national interests are objective and unchanging unless the 
structure of power dynamics change, how do new policies emerge in the absence of 
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significant structural change, or alternatively why “loser” policies that obviously 
harm national interest remain? What are the restraints on decision-makers to change 
policies, or alternatively not to change those even though “clear judgment” would 
have them take other steps?201  
As was indicated in the last chapter, at the center of the Indian national 
interest is the survival of the state and its sovereignty.  However, Weldes finds the 
realist notion of national interest problematic primarily for two reasons.202  First, its 
substance is very general and uncertain.  It does not give any clue as to how specific 
policy choices of states in specific areas can be explained.  Second, it is based totally 
on an empiricist epistemology that leaves no room for interpretation.  It is only 
possible to apprehend why some situations possess a threat to a country and why 
responding to them is ‘in the national interest’ of that country. 203  This means that 
national interests are derived from the representations “through which state officials 
and others make sense of the world around them.”204  Representational practices are 
also tied to power relations, because some discourses are more powerful than others 
and thus can privilege some players and their ideas while marginalizing others.205  
The most prominent example of such representations is state centric approach.   
Within the representational process, state officials first, set up representations 
of ‘the self’ and other states and their officials, non-state actors, and the like.  
Whether distinct or indistinct, all these objects are given identities, such as hostile, 
strong, regional leader, or puppet of a particular system.206  Then, relations with and 
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actions to be taken against the others are set according to these identities.207  Finally, 
through these representations, national interests have been defined.  Representations 
have inclined to determine the self, the others, threat perceptions and the appropriate 
responses to these threats.  This is a noticeable social process that, in the end, endows 
states with specific national interests. 
These representations are constructed with two mechanisms, interpellation 
and articulation, which facilitate in the “politics of meaning fixing”.208  Articulation 
is a process wherein linguistic resources and cultural raw materials produce 
meanings. 209  To put it in a different way, it is “the establishment of certain 
compelling links between elements of meaning.”210  The language of national interest 
is based on terms and ideas that are extant and make sense within a culture in order 
to “produce contingent and contextually specific representations of the world.”211  
Successful articulations cause linguistic elements to be inherently connected and 
their constructed meanings appear natural as if they were a true portrayal of 
reality.212  On the other hand, since articulations are social processes, they might also 
change or be contested.  So, they must be produced, reproduced and successfully 
transformed through the discursive practices of actors,213 in other words state 
officials. 
Interpellation is the second constructive element.  It refers to the situation in 
which “identities or subject-positions are created and recreated and concrete 
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individuals are ‘hailed’ into or interpellated by them”.214  In fact, intrepellation is a 
test for articulation chains to determine how convincing articulations are for 
people.215  Successful interpellations appear as common sense.  For instance, 
representations usually put ‘the state’ as the main subject, and its national interest 
rationalizes its actions in defense of these interests.  Citizens are interpellated into the 
national interest of this specific state.  They may use “we” in place of the state when 
talking about foreign policies.216 
In the end, the elements that are presented by realism as being observable and 
natural, are in fact socially constructed through articulation and interpellation.  
Dominant constructions of national interest, which are usually perceived as common 
sense, are the results of successful articulation and interpellation.  At this stage, 
critical constructivism tries to denaturalize “the common sense understandings to 
make their constructedness apparent”.217  The next section will examine a concrete 
example of these processes. 
 
 
 
4.3 CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITIES IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR 
POLICY 
In this section, what kinds of identities were distributed to which subjects by 
Indian officials will be analyzed.  Representational practices, the articulation and 
interpellation will be more thoroughly examined by focusing on the construction of 
India’s own identity, the identification of neighbors and the West as opponents, and 
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the implications of nuclear power for India in technological terms.  The way in which 
the national interests of India in the late 1960s and early 1970s had already been 
defined by these representations will in this way be more clearly seen.  To indicate 
continuity and/or contradictions, examples from the cent past will be given as well.  
 
4.3.1 CONSTRUCTION OF THE IDENTITY OF INDIA AND ITS 
OPPONENTS 
The Indian nuclear programme began under the authority of Jawaharlal 
Nehru, who thought that “military spending was, at best, a necessary evil.”218  He 
generally tried to remain on good terms with China, and only nine days before he 
died, stated that “we are determined not to use weapons for war purposes.  We do not 
make atom bombs.  I do not think we will.”219  However, the 1962 Sino-Indian 
border war and the Chinese nuclear test had a number of repercussions in India.  
Suddenly, a China in possession of nuclear weapons was announced as the most 
serious threat to India’s national interest.  In addition, the very existence of these 
weapons was declared as having the most immediate importance for India.  Indian 
authorities were afraid of Chinese nuclear weapons not only because of their absolute 
deterrence but also because of their psychological effects on Indian society: 
“…China may subject a non-nuclear India to periodic blackmail, weaken its people’s 
spirit of resistance and self-confidence, and thus achieve without a war its major 
political and military objectives in Asia220” (emphasis added).  China was pointed to 
as an opponent that has particular policies over Asia, which could be pursued by 
deteriorating Indian society’s shakti, and these policies were against the security of 
Indian territories.  
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During the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, China supported Pakistan 
diplomatically and threatened to open another front along India’s Himalayan 
border.221  Thus, the identity given to China by India as a deadly enemy was 
reaffirmed. The articulation was made of China as being an aggressor, an 
expansionist country with nuclear weapons and the neighbor of India.  The meaning 
that Indian officials222 gave Chinese actions shaped the relations between the two 
countries in the following years. Using the word ‘articulation’ does not mean that 
China was not in fact an aggressor, but merely that the Indians named it as such.  
This means that one of the significant building blocks of Indian national interest, on 
which the decision to refuse to sign the NPT rested, was created by the identity that 
India attributed to China and its policies.  India could not accept being a party to a 
treaty that privileged its opponent at the expense of its own security.  In this way, 
critical constructivism counters the realist assumption that national interest is an 
objective reality for statesmen.  It is rather a social construct, whose development 
begins and sometimes changes direction according to cultural and historical relations 
and conflicts.  It is different from the perceptions in realist terms because in this 
process, a goal is perceived.  Self and other identities are constructed without relying 
on perceptions and/or misunderstandings. 
The representational practices leading to the definition of national interest 
related to the nuclear policy in the years close to the signing of the NPT is the main 
topic of analysis of this study.  However, showing the continuity of these 
representations and this policy is also of great significance.  Examination of the 
situation today, therefore, has particular importance as well.    Pakistan, with whom 
India has had numerous severe problems and armed conflicts, went nuclear after 
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India’s peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974.  In this sense, Pakistan’s representation is 
also a matter to be considered in relation to nuclear policies.  Long before it went 
nuclear, Pakistan was regarded as a long-term adversary of India.  One of the most 
notable developments of Indian nuclear policy was the 1998 Indian nuclear test.223  
The reasons given for this test also seemed to demonstrate that India still maintained 
similar representations of its enemies, with its growing conventional/unconventional 
capabilities and arms transfers to Pakistan, China still appeared to be regarded as a 
threatening neighbor.  Swamy asserts that shared distrust between India and its 
neighbors, primary China but Pakistan as well, has led to a reckless race for 
security.224  India and Pakistan have been racing to increase the size, sophistication 
and operational readiness of their nuclear strike arsenals for a long time, but the tests 
and declarations of May 1998 made a qualitative difference in the situation.225  
Pakistan’s launch of the Ghauri missile, developed with Chinese assistance, in March 
1998 had been the most immediate provocation.226  The articulation of the identities 
of these countries may have strengthened the view that India was not allowed to 
respond in a different way.  Considering serious problems of India with China and 
Pakistan, India perceived threat from these countries.  The nuclear developments in 
Pakistan and China may have served as a trigger for India to evaluate these 
developments as being evidences of their hostile intentions.  Additionally, India’s 
articulations of these countries might have created a self-fulfilling prophecy on the 
hostile intentions of China and Pakistan regarding the nuclear developments in these 
countries.  Within this framework, conducting the 1998 nuclear test was in the 
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national interest of India.   
On the other hand, India’s own identity emphasizes its peaceful and moderate 
responses to threats arising from its aggressive neighbors. According to the website 
of India’s Ministry of Defence, “India’s response to these threats [tribal, ethnic, left 
wing and radical jehadi movements in India and the possibility of gaining access to 
weapons of mass destruction in Pakistan being the perceived threat] and challenges 
has always been restrained, measured and moderate in keeping with its peaceful 
outlook and reputation as a peace loving country.”227  India’s identity is thus 
constructed upon the basis of its peaceful and moderate characteristics.  If the 
articulation of this identity results in differences between the self and the others, it is 
expected that countries that India perceives as threats, will be labeled aggressive and 
extremist.  And indeed, looking again at the website of the Indian Ministry of 
Defence, it is possible to see such features attributed to Pakistan:  “…the single 
greatest threat to peace and stability in the region is posed by the combination of 
terrorism nurtured in and by Pakistan for its strategic objectives, and the ingrained 
adventurism of the Pakistani military motivated by its obsessive and compulsive 
hostility towards India. (…) It [Pakistan] is the root and epicenter of international 
terrorism in the region and beyond”228 (emphasis added).  Bearing in mind the fact 
that India perceives itself as a regional hegemon, security in the region is thus 
considered within the context of national security.  The single greatest security threat 
in the region, named as terrorism, is the threat toward India, and the source is 
Pakistan.  While in the former quotation, terrorism was presented attributed some 
segments in Pakistan and India, in the latter, it is Pakistan as a state that is presented 
as the epicenter of terrorism.  Its military is adventuristic, and this quality is 
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inherited.  In other words, it is a given that Pakistan’s military follows adventuristic 
strategies, and this cannot change.  Additionally, Pakistani hostility towards India is 
obsessive (fanatical) and compulsive (uncontrollable).  In the end, it was not and is 
not possible for India –a peaceful and moderate country, whose nuclear weapons are 
“only for self-defence and …to ensure that India’s security, independence and 
integrity are not threatened in the future”229 — to sign the NPT (in the past and now) 
as a NNWS, while there exists a nuclear China supporting (a now nuclear) Pakistan 
— a terrorist, hostile, adventuristic and threatening country.  
Historically and socially, it is understandable that states present themselves as 
peaceful and moderate.  The same claim can be valid when it comes to defending 
their nuclear policies.  On the other hand, India’s stress on the defensive nature of 
these weapons and the peaceful path of Indian foreign policy has native cultural 
roots.  First, Nehruvian secularists see these weapons as a guarantee against external 
attacks and important tools to provide national security in the eyes of the Indian 
people and to ensure the unity of India.  This argument will be discussed in the 
following sections.  Second, Hindu nationalists refer to history of the Indian 
civilization as follows:  Hindus have always suffered at the hands of Greek, Islamic 
and Christian invaders.  Postcolonial India’s decision to keep its nuclear option open 
is seen in defensive and moral terms.  Trough nuclear deterrence, Hindu civilization 
will survive in the future without having to endure new invasions (due to the 
defensive nature of nuclear weapons).  Moreover, Hindus have never harbored 
aggressive inclinations against others230, and thus the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
could not be morally wrong since they would not be used for aggression by the 
Indian state.  It can be therefore seen that besides the workings of the social process, 
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the cultural meanings of nuclear weapons have also contributed to the articulation 
and interpellation process regarding nuclear policy. 
Even the signal of the government in 1971 to nuclear scientists to go ahead 
and prepare for underground tests was motivated by defensive reasons “in the 
deepest sense of the word”, because the country was alone and vulnerable “in the 
face of the massive influx of refugees from East Bengal and the explosion has [had] 
taken place in the wake of the massive piling up of highly sophisticated weaponry in 
the Persian region.”231  In this sense, India went nuclear because of defensive 
concerns due to circumstances involving its neighbors.  This can be regarded as the 
naturalization process in relation to Indian nuclear power.  Again, this does not mean 
that Pakistan and/or China do not pursue strategies contrary to the Indian national 
interest.  The aim of analyzing these presentations is to show how articulations had 
already defined the national interest of India. 
These kinds of articulations help to produce a broader “we”.  This “we” is not 
simply the state, decision-makers or society alone but all of them.  Weldes points out 
that this concept results in recognition as follows:  “Yes, ‘we’ are like this (i.e., a 
tough leader, democratic, and in favor of freedom) and not like that (i.e., alien, 
despotic, and aggressive).”232  These differences provide identity distinctiveness. 
One of the interesting features of the articulation of the Indian national 
interest vis-à-vis Pakistan is that successful articulation of Pakistani identity in India 
accelerates the intensity of interpellation.  Accordingly, a socially constructed Indian 
national interest is accepted by Indian citizens with the help of interpellation.  Yet at 
the same time, this interpellation of individuals puts an additional burden on foreign 
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policy makers in terms of nuclear deterrence requirements.  After a time, nuclear 
arsenals must be large enough not only to deter the ‘enemy’, but also to be able to 
promote confidence among the domestic citizenry in their own country’s security.233  
In this sense, articulation shapes society’s perception, but these constructed 
intractable ties of individuals also influence the response of India of what it is that is 
‘in the national interest of India’.  In other words, the nature of the national interest is 
determined by the presentational practices of Indian officials and in some cases 
interpellated individuals as well. 
 
4.3.2 INDIA AS THE LEADER OF THE REGIONAL AND NON-
ALIGNED MOVEMENT VS THE NEOCOLONIAL POWERS 
Today, India perceives itself as a preeminent regional power.  With its 
economic and military power and its huge size in terms of territory and population, 
India continues to assert its role as a regional hegemon.  On the other hand, it has 
been emphasized that obtaining a leadership position in the region did not bring 
about expansionist designs in Indian foreign policy.234   
After independence, the country’s authority as an influential political force in 
the international relations and its being recognized as the leader of the non-aligned 
movement235 were the main triggers of this perception236; the role of India was 
presented as the arsenal and supply base of the democracies has increased its self-
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confidence.237  Moreover, after its victory in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, India was 
perceived as the greatest power on the subcontinent.238  It was important for India’s 
national interest to keep the nuclear option open in order to maintain its identity as a 
regional hegemon in the face of a nuclear China. The unique character of India as a 
democratic, powerful and independent South Asian power necessitated making this 
decision in the face of the “unique challenges”239 India has in the region.  It must be 
taken into account that all these characteristics have a meaning within a cultural 
context. Uniqueness comes from the cultural and social difference from other 
identities.  Difference shapes identity, but in order to protect identity, difference is 
converted to otherness, which in the end becomes a threat to identity.240  The “unique 
character” of India was threatened by the “others”, who were then named as “unique 
challenges”.  In the face of these unique challenges, following a different nuclear 
policy (i.e., not joining the NPT) was presented as being in the Indian national 
interest. 
Considering India’s leadership of the non-aligned movement and its colonial 
history, it can be claimed that India’s desire to use nuclear power as a means of 
pursuing security is rooted in its post-colonial identity.   Since its independence, 
India has always supported the idea of independence from “European domination”, 
of developing a new Asiatic outlook on international relations and of shifting the 
centre of gravity of world influence from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.241  Europe 
was interpreted as a group of powers pursuing domination.  After the colonial era, 
Europe remained from the Indian point of view a threat to Indian core values and 
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independence because Europe continued to perceive the West as the center of 
international politics.   
Of course this articulation was not established only for Europe; The United 
States was also involved in the process.  Kirpal does not hesitate to point out directly 
the harsh opposition of India to neocolonial endeavors: “…the Asiatic peoples will 
never again accept the old colonial systems of Great Britain, France, Holland and 
the United States; and any attempt to revive these systems will stimulate strong 
national movements of resistance.”242   Moreover, the close U.S.-Pakistani relations 
strengthened the opponent identity of Pakistan as an opponent and the US as a 
neocolonial power for Indian citizens and facilitated their interpellation. In another 
case, an increase in the presence of the United States in the Indian Ocean was a 
sufficient reason for vocal opposition by India.243  However, such opposition has also 
been presented within the context of the defensive nature of Indian foreign policy. 
Neocolonialism is still an important matter in the international arena244, and India’s 
every move to counter colonially motivated acts is regarded as defensive.  In other 
words, the (neocolonialist) West is taking an offensive course and (non-aligned) 
India is on the defensive.  Affirmative neutrality and non-alignment raised India’s 
international prestige245, and this articulation of the West/Europe was interpellated to 
many individuals in the third world.  Consequently, India’s non-aligned leadership 
was produced by articulation of identities of the Indian self and the West and 
supported by the interpellation of a large number of individuals, including many who 
were not Indian citizens. Moreover, India’s growing nuclear capability further 
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boosted India’s image abroad,246 especially in the region. 
India has refused to become a signatory to the NPT (Non-Proliferation 
Treaty) because it has not wanted to accept rules that had already been defined by 
nuclear weapon states247 – including one of its main opponents, China, and the past 
colonizer of India, the UK.  Indians have argued that it is no accident that the five 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are the countries that 
have nuclear weapons. Shaumian pointed out that the NPT is discriminatory because 
it became a specific legal ground for the “recognition of the monopoly right of five 
nuclear powers to possess nuclear weapons and use them for strengthening their 
domination of the international arena” (emphasis added).248  India was determined to 
attain self-reliance in defence and to make it known that the nation would not allow 
discriminatory treatment at the hands of the nuclear great powers with a treaty that 
was unequal, discriminatory, conferred unequal privileges on nuclear haves and 
imposed one-sided restrictions on non-nuclear states.249  Accepting this would be 
accepting a kind of inferior status for India, one that disregarded its size, long 
heritage of civilization and economic potential.250 India embraced opposition to 
every kind of neo-colonial attempt, that could be a potential source of the imposition 
of Western values and a status quo where the West had a privileged position upon 
other states, and the NPT was presented as one of these attempts.   
Refusing to join the NPT also reasserted its identity as a regional and non-
aligned leader.  Leadership identity generally requires being credible, and country 
that wishes to have this identity must continuously demonstrate its capability to 
counter threats by opponents and refusal to give concessions even under pressure.  
                     
246
 Vijay Sen Budhraj, “Indian Foreign Policy”, p. 351. 
247
 Varadarajan, “Constructivism, Identity and Neoliberal (in)Security”, p.333. 
248
 Shaumian, “Indian Foreign Policy”, p. 572. 
249
 Budhraj, “Indian Foreign Policy”, p. 350. 
250
 Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokrahan II”, p. 174. 
 75 
This is of course, a masculine definition of leadership.  At any rate, Indian proposals 
that called for the right of NNWSs to carry out “peaceful nuclear explosions” and 
nuclear guarantees for NNWS were not accepted by the UN Political Committee in 
1965.251 Consequently, India demonstrated its credibility as a “strong” leader and did 
not sign the NPT.  Ganguly states that Indian politicians feared that India’s efforts to 
get a nuclear guarantee from the NWSs “would compromise their country’s 
nonalignment stance”.252  Indeed, seeking guarantees from NWSs was a rational 
behavior in terms of creating a middle ground, which could make it possible for India 
to take part in the NPT; however, even this action was interpreted as giving 
concessions to the great powers.  From the perspective of this masculine 
understanding of leadership, seeking a peaceful solution was considered a potential 
weakness.   
 
4.3.3 ARTICULATION AND INTERPELLATION IN RELATION TO 
TECHNOLOGY 
Indian “peaceful nuclear explosion” on May 18, 1974 met with severe 
international reactions.  However, the nuclear export limitations of the industrial 
powers made the Indian programme of necessity indigenous.253  This situation 
brought scientific elites a privileged status because they were the ones who 
developed this high technology.  Most of the scientific elite believed that nuclear 
weapons would improve India’s security and presented them as near-mythical 
elements in the defence of the country.  Developing nuclear capabilities was also a 
chance to demonstrate India’s scientific capabilities.  The Indian nationalist elite 
saw modernity as coming from the legacy of the British Empire – Western 
                     
251
 Ibid., pp. 155-158. 
252
 Ibid., p. 153. 
253
 Ibid., p. 161. 
 76 
education, the judicial system and social reforms, to name but a few.254  
Consequently, it was very important to prove for all to see that India could develop 
its own high technology.  The above-mentioned peaceful explosion was a sign that 
India was on par with NWS in nuclear technology.255  Nuclear power and scientific 
progress were linked closely, and the declaration of May 11 –the day of the first 
tests in 1998- as ‘Technology Day’ is the most obvious example of how such 
linkage was established between Indian indigenous technological development and 
nuclear weapons.256 
Ganguly is averse to seeing the influence of the scientific elite’s ideas on 
political decision making.257  However, even if they were not successful in affecting 
bureaucratic decisions regarding nuclear policies, it does not mean that their ideas 
had no effect on decision-making at all.   It would be inaccurate if the role of 
powerful scientific and industrial lobbies such as the Department of Atomic Agency 
(DAE), the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and the 
Indian Space and Research Organization (ISRO) in the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and strategic missiles were to be ignored.258 Additionally, whenever there is 
a successful achievement in the nuclear field, the technological elite is applauded by 
society.  Events like that lead to the legitimization of the technological elite’s 
suggestions in the eyes of the public; their statements come to be taken more 
seriously and their voice becomes more hearable due to their popularity at all levels 
of society.   
It cannot be denied that the scientific elite also played an influential role in 
smoothing the interpellation process regarding these policies.  Even though the scope 
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of my study does not allow for an extensive analysis of interpellation process, one 
example will be given in order to clarify the interpellation practice.  Especially after 
the nuclear tests of 1998, Indian citizens regained self-confidence, which had 
declined after the fading away of the non-aligned movement, and strengthened shakti 
(strength) within that reinforced the faith in the state as well.  In other words, it can 
be said that 1998 tests underlie the state centric approaches and representational 
practices and speeded up the interpellation process.  The Sunday Observer Special 
(New Delhi, Mumbai, May 24-23, 1998) undertook a campaign to communicate 
messages from the public to the government under the title ‘Mr. Prime Minister We 
Are With You’.  A typical message read as follows: “Today, we feel even more 
proud to be Indian.  By successfully exploding five indigenously developed nuclear 
devices, our scientists have shown that we are as good as the best in the world.”259  
The subject, the Indian state, is here thus accepted by the individual citizens, and the 
‘we’ feeling –of being one of the world’s “bests” as technologically developed and 
powerful Indians - legitimizes Indian nuclear policy in the eyes of society and helps 
to make common sense of the national interest.  Moreover, even while thanking the 
Prime Minister, people did not forget the role of scientists in this achievement. 
The cultural importance of technology in the articulation process again 
derives primarily from India’s colonial past.  Nehruvian secularists state that in the 
colonial age, pre-industrial India was used as a source of raw material and a market 
for finished industrial products by British industry.260  India struggled to foster 
‘national unity’ after its independence, and both national unity and technological 
improvement (in order to eliminate India as being the market of industrial world) 
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perceived as ‘musts’ for the security of the country. Consequently, in India, 
nationhood and modernity were considered as closely related in terms of the 
development and dignity of the society, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and long-
range missiles was considered necessary to guard “the strategic frontiers and political 
ego of the Indian state, and by its extension, that of Indian peoples.”261  As can be 
seen from this quotation, the ‘Indian state’ is extended to encompass ‘Indian people’, 
and it may be seen as a way of transforming state centric articulation to 
interpellation, which in fact has already defined the Indian national interest as 
accepted by the Indian people. 
To summarize the Indian national interest regarding the NPT revolved around 
the articulation of many representational objects and arguments based on Indian non-
aligned and regional leadership and post-colonial identities, and the related 
interpellation of individuals, mostly Indian citizens but also citizens of other 
countries in the non-alignment movement.  In other words, nuclear proliferation in 
India was related to national prestige, ambitions of great powers, the post-colonial 
project of modernity and the need to get free of the ghost of colonialism.262 These 
articulations entailed the production and reproduction of certain identities through 
cultural and social processes.  Missile artifacts were efficient tools to strengthen the 
Indian “state” and reinstate its importance as the protector of “modernity, security, 
and stability in an increasingly fractionated polity suffering from a crisis of 
governance.”263  State identity was restored through successful articulations.  It 
should be taken into account that in developing countries like India, producing 
national security goods for the common good is an effective means of contributing to 
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state and nation building.264 
First, the NPT was articulated as a specific design of Western powers, most of 
which were indeed past colonial powers, in order to make the Third World accept the 
rules and norms of the West.  Additionally, China (and Pakistan after it went nuclear) 
was one of the most prominent and aggressive opponents against which preventive 
measures were needed.  Second, India was articulated as a Third World country 
pursuing its own independence in opposition to the West at any cost.  These were the 
linguistic bases that had the capacity to affect Indian society by means of 
interpellation of the prospective definition of national interest that needed to be 
examined more thoroughly.  In all these processes, state centric approach that 
determines the state as the main subject and distributes identities and meanings to 
other objects, prevailed over other discourses, so that state officials have been the 
primary source of the articulations.  Discourses were mostly formulated around the 
sharp differences between the West and India to emphasize the reasons of 
disagreement for the parties’ regarding Indian nuclear policy.   In other words, 
differences and otherness both constituted and threatened265 Indian self-identity. 
One of the main consequences of the articulation and interpellation process 
was the legitimization within India of the Indian decision not to sign the NPT, 
because the contrary was not appropriate for India as a country that had active 
nonalignment policies and a postcolonial identity.  Continuity of this policy 
reasserted Indian state identity and “permitted reproduction of a broader ‘we’”266 
around this identity.  Thus, Indian identity was created around terms such as 
leadership, regional hegemony, the non-aligned movement, technological 
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development, independence from the West, credibility and nuclear strength.  
However, leadership and strength were masculine elements in this identity, which 
were understood as “toughness”.  By defining its opponents as aggressive, terrorist, 
expansionist, domination-oriented and inherently hostile, by going nuclear and 
relying more on its nuclear weapons capability, India reproduced its own masculine 
identity.  
At this point, one factor is important to mention.  First, even Weldes usually 
focuses on the process of articulating the national interest by decision-makers in her 
studies.  After this national interest becomes mature, interpellated people may also 
directly or indirectly affect the course of pursuing this interest.  In the case of India, 
government officials might consider society’s expectations due to the political 
concerns when increasing the level of nuclear arsenals, and favorable attitudes 
towards the scientific elite created by the 1998 tests might qualify the elite’s right to 
have a say in the decision-making process.  Of course, the level of this effect is open 
to discussion; however, it is an important factor not to overlook in this chapter.  
Second, state centric articulations marginalized other alternatives for India 
related to the NPT.  India was always presented as having no other rational 
alternative but refusing to sign the NPT.  For example, left-wing groups denigrated 
nuclearization because they considered a symbol of the colonization of India’s 
political conscience and accused the government of copying the national security 
models of more advanced capitalist countries in disregard of India’s humane, 
equitable, moral and just view of international order.267  State centric approach 
silenced all these claims, and sometimes, not only silenced but also brought 
accusation against those that made claims contrary to the state centric approaches.  
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Human rights defenders have often been under duress from both state and private 
actors, and their activities labeled as “anti-national”.268  Moreover, according to 
Chaturvedi, the “anti-national” label is not limited to human rights defenders but 
applied to anyone who disagrees with ‘pro-nuke’ policies, and the term “anti-
national” is just one in the list of expressions of condemnation like deshdrohis 
(traitors), “west-inspired anti-nationals” or, simply, CIA agents.269 
On the other hand, India is on the verge of a change in this regard.  Even 
though India has never joined the NPT and tested nuclear weapons in 1998, President 
George W. Bush’s agenda includes sharing American civilian nuclear technology 
with India.  In return, India is expected to take steps to ensure the Americans that it 
will not export weapons technology, and that it will continue to observe a 
moratorium on testing and separate its civilian and military nuclear programmes, 
with the former subject to an inspection regime.270  Although this move has not been 
formally ratified,271 this development still demonstrates that the past articulations 
regarding nuclear policy and the United States might change and a new 
understanding of the NPT and nuclear inspections appear. 
Third and perhaps more importantly, this social construction reemphasized 
and legitimized the above-mentioned identities of India in the eyes of the Indian 
people.  Indian identity was reproduced and individuals were interpellated into it. 
In summary, the Indian national interest regarding nuclear power has never 
been a given.  The meanings of the events and identities leading to the present 
understanding of national interest were constructed socially and culturally.  The 
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Indian refusal to be a party to the NPT as a NNWS and its ongoing policy of nuclear 
development have reenacted and reproduced Indian self-identity.  India’s post-
colonial history also makes this case study interesting from the perspective of 
cultural construction of insecurities between the West and the rest of the world in 
relation to nuclear power.  Most of the time, Indian nuclear policy has been a proving 
ground for reproducing its postcolonial identity in opposition to the West. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
“We do not believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is essential for national security, and we 
have followed a conscious decision in this regard.  We are also convinced that the existence of 
nuclear weapons diminishes international security.  We, therefore, seek their complete elimination.  
These are fundamental precepts that have been an integral basis of India’s foreign and national 
security policy.” 
 
-Salman Haider, India’s Foreign Secretary, March 1996, before the Conference on Disarmament272 
 The nuclear programs of the DPRK, Israel, India, Pakistan and Iran present 
serious challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.  The discussions on the 
reasons and impacts of these challenges and the possible counter measures to be 
taken against them generally revolve around the NPT in reference to its setup and 
fundamentals.  While talking about these issues, two topics have crucial importance:  
becoming familiar with the NPT (with its specific regime, nature, provisions and 
obligations) and, at least, arriving to a basic understanding of motivations toward 
conducting nuclear programs of these countries.  The analysis of the Indian decision 
not to be a signatory to the NPT is presented to serve as a tool to understand these 
two points. 
 The analysis was prepared to be a guide firstly for figuring out the nature of 
the NPT and then the Indian motivations for its certain nuclear policy.  First, we 
traced the origins of nonproliferation policy back to the World War II in order to get 
a better understanding of how the treaty turned out to be a diplomatic, technical and 
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political obstacle for countries that might pursue nuclear proliferation policies.  After 
that, in order to understand why non-signatory parties see the treaty to be 
unacceptable, we made an overview through the articles of the NPT and its 
verification system in cooperation with the IAEA.  The analysis also revealed the 
main motives and concerns of the signatories to the treaty and potential and past 
breaches of the provisions.  Lastly, the information regarding threshold states, which 
India is involved too, is given to explain the extent of challenges to the 
nonproliferation regime by these states. 
 Why did India not sign the NPT?  International relations discipline is a 
fragmented one in terms of theories.  There is no grand theory of international 
relations and there is not a sensible chance creating one in the near future as well.  
Accordingly, in order to answer the above-mentioned question, we used a two-way 
approach.  In two separate chapters, India’s decision was analyzed through three 
variants of realism, namely offensive and defensive and neoclassical realism and 
critical constructivism.   Leaving neoclassical realists aside, who include first and 
second image variables such as internal extraction processes, domestic politics and 
leaders’ perceptions; realist view does not consider any influential actor in anarchical 
world other than state.  This is one of the most distinctive features of realism than 
critical constructivism.  Critical constructivism focuses on international relations in 
an entirely different perspective.  It includes all actors in relation to the creation of 
representational practices in the analysis of India’s nuclear policy whereas realist 
variants are mostly interested in the international system and its effects on the Indian 
“state” regarding its nuclear policy.    Realists attempt to see the behaviors of states 
by analogy with the behavior of individuals making calculated and rational 
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choices.273  Critical contructivism make us see the root causes that why India follows 
a path that is different from the rest of the world regarding nuclear disarmament.   
Apart from realism, it also answers the question of “how is it possible that India can 
change its root in terms of nuclear policies regarding the US initiative in the absence 
of a significant structural change?”.  From critical theory perspective, as long as US 
(or any other country) treats India as a sovereign, technologically developed and 
equal party, India can take US (or other countries’) offers into consideration.  
Moreover, realism assumes that state preferences are fixed and uniformly 
conflicting.274  However, this assumption does not mean that every situation in state 
preferences is conflicting (particularly in the case of defensive realism).  The nature 
of explanations related to state preferences are highly connected to realism’s belief in 
‘given’ concepts.  The terms like national interest, anarchy, security dilemma and the 
like are given.  They cannot change depending on time or place.  For critical 
constructivists, there is every reason to question the ‘given’ character of these 
concepts.  Realities are socially, historically and culturally constructed.  The change 
in the way we think about international relations or, for this specific case, the 
construction of India’s national interest in regard to nuclear policy will bring 
awareness that leads to a realization of the constructedness of “common sense” in 
terms of nuclear policy.  Critical constructivism especially focuses on how 
representational practices such as articulation and interpellation are tied together and 
how they define the national interest of a country beforehand.  Indeed, national 
interest is not given but rather it is constructed.  India’s nuclear policy, which is 
defined as a tool for pursuing national interest, is accepted as given by successful 
articulations of opponents, putting itself as a regional leader and non-aligned power 
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against neo-colonialism and related links between technological development and 
nuclear policy.  The articulations are further strengthened and measured by their 
interpellation into society.  However, interpellation process analysis in this study is 
very limited because of limited scope and data of the thesis. 
Realism describes international structure to be having a basis on material 
capabilities. Even though (defensive) neoclassical realists claim that state leaders’ 
observations play an important role in forming the responses of states to the 
structural modifiers,275 at the end of the day, neoclassical realists conclude that “the 
scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy [are] driven first and foremost by its 
place in the international system and particularly by its relative material power 
capabilities”.276  In other words, no matter what the antecedent conditions are, the 
realist variants mentioned in this study take material capabilities and their 
distribution as the main elements in the definition of the structure.   
In general, constructivism and particularly critical constructivism think that 
the view a structure depending solely on material capabilities does not meet the 
standards of constructivist view of international relations.  Shared knowledge and 
social, historical and cultural practices are as important as material capabilities.  
Because people/actors give meanings to objects and perceive them according to these 
meanings later.  For instance, the discursive constitution of Indian threat perception 
from Chinese nuclear weapons does not mean that these weapons are made up but 
that that their meanings are constructed. 
Lastly, critical constructivism aims to attract the attention towards how reality 
construction reifies, reflects and enacts relations of power and denaturalizes 
dominant constructions and raises awareness for alternative world views.  The 
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emphasis of realism on ‘objective/given’ nature of certain terms is criticized by 
critical constructivists because this attitude strengthens the state centric approach.  
State-centric approach either reemphasizes or creates state identity and the identity of 
opponents and the interpellation of these articulations silences other alternative 
discourses.  Realism overlooks the centrality of process of interpretation.  In this 
regard, by accepting one discourse as the sole reality, it also ignores other openings 
on security issues in relation with nuclear weapons as well.   
In summary, realist variants explain the continuity of Indian decision as not 
joining the NPT mostly because of structural variables, however, critical 
constructivists also show social, cultural and historical constructions behind the 
scene as important factors and try to point out to the internal dynamics that play a 
role in the representational practices. 
Although realists and empiricist epistemology are harshly criticized by 
critical constructivists, claims of critical constructivists are not problem-free.  In the 
process of interest and identity construction, both social and critical constructivists 
are inclined to override the significance of the global economy as a constitutive 
factor.277   Actually, India’s postcolonial identity has a strong connection with the 
global economy.  The influence of the exploitative economic relationships with the 
British Empire led to state planning and the promotion of self-reliance (swadeshi) in 
the economic policy of independent India.278  India was determined not to be a part 
of global capitalist games of ‘exploitative Other’.  Varadarajan claims that the 
initiation of the economic liberalization program demanded by the IMF shook “a 
constitutive element of India’s postcolonial identity, enabling a discourse of ‘lost 
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self-esteem’”.279  The neo-liberal reforms threatened India’s self identity but the 
1998 nuclear tests proved that “postcolonial state had not completely failed” because 
carrying out these nuclear tests was a way to demonstrate that “India could still chart 
its own course” facing opposition from the great powers.280  As Varadarajan points 
out, constructivism and critical constructivism fails to take global economy into 
account while analyzing identity formation. 
Finally, there is a practical problem in applying critical constructivist claims 
to some studies.  Critical constructivism is especially known for its stress on the 
effects of culture in constructions of identities, threats and insecurities.  A deep 
analysis of certain policies necessitates having an adequate knowledge of 
anthropology and political science as well as international relations.  On the other 
hand, it is not usually possible for an undergraduate or even Masters Degree student 
to have a profound familiarity with all of these disciplines.  In accordance with this, 
these students’ applications of critical constructivism to their studies might be 
imperfect or they might hesitate to use this theory in their academic works. 
Although this analysis particularly deals with India’s nuclear policy, it also 
stands as an exemplar for studying the nuclear policies of other countries that have 
never been a party to the NPT.  This study suggests a ground for observing how two 
mainstreaming theories differ over explaining the Indian decision.  This situation 
enables us to see their strong and weak points in explaining a case.  A comparative 
study like this can provide a broader picture for the reasons why Israel or Pakistan 
does not become a party to the NPT.  The same framework might be applied to the 
DPRK and to an extent to Iran by using method of difference instead of method of 
agreement, which was used throughout this study, in examining the development of 
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nuclear policy in regard to the NPT.  In a few words, the study tries to establish a 
comparative work to be applied to countries that have problematic relations with the 
NPT regime.  By this way, their main motives giving rise to these problems might 
be seen from different angles.  Since understanding a problem is the half of solving 
it, this various-level approach can provide a comprehensive bargaining card for the 
NPT signatories against thresholds to attract them into the nonproliferation regime.  
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